CLSC Dialogues

About CLSC Dialogues

CLSC Dialogues tackles complex and pressing questions about China’s emergence as a global power and its implications for the US military. The podcast uses Strategic Landpower as the focal point of discussion—providing unique and important insights that cut across the aperture of the levers of power. The forum provides senior leaders and practitioners with a better understanding of the strategies, capabilities, and the integration of the PLA into the CCP’s campaign to turn the rules-based international order to its advantage. Further, the podcast shares insights and recommendations for developing better deterrence strategies and campaigns for the United States and our allies. Questions or feedback? E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

Publisher

U.S. Army War College Public Affairs

Category

education · government · history

Language

en

Explicit

No

First episode

27 Mar 2024

Latest episode

22 Jul 2026

Latest episodes

30 episodes in the feed.

1. 

   22 Jul 2026

   CLSC Dialogues – Ep 30 – COL Kyle Marcrum and Sheena Chestnut Greitens – China’s Community of Common Destiny and the Global Initiatives

   Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, visiting faculty at the China Landpower Studies Center at the US Army War College and an associate professor at the University of Texas—Austin, joins the CLSC Dialogues to discuss the People’s Republic of China’s four Global Initiatives and her recent publication on China’s mobilizational initiatives. Keywords: China, Global Initiatives, Community of Common Destiny COL Kyle Marcrum Welcome to the CLSC Dialogues, a production of the China Landpower Studies Center at the US Army War College. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or the Department of War. I’m Colonel Kyle Marcrum, the Director of Global Research here at the US Army War College, and your host for today’s conversation. Today I’m joined virtually by Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, visiting faculty at the China Landpower Studies Center at the US Army War College. She is concurrently an associate professor at the University of Texas—Austin, where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor in chief of the Texas National Security Review. Dr. Chestnut Greitens research focuses on China’s internal security and foreign policy. She is the author of two books and is currently writing a book on how the prioritization of regime security shapes China’s grand strategy. Sheena, thank you for joining us today. Sheena Chestnut Greitens Thanks for having me. It’s great to be here. Marcrum So, you write a lot about China’s global initiatives, and I was wondering if you could describe these global initiatives for us and what China’s goals are for these initiatives. Chestnut Greitens Yeah. So, these global initiatives are something that Xi Jinping started announcing in the first half of the 2020s. And he has four major initiatives. That’s how Chinese scholars and Chinese state media refer to them. The first one he announced was the Global Development Initiative. That was followed by the Global Security Initiative, which is the one that I’ve focused most on a little over a year later. That was followed by a Global Civilizational Initiative, and then finally the Global Governance Initiative, which was announced last fall during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in China itself. And these four initiatives form part of what Xi Jinping has talked about for several years as a phrase that’s translated as “community of common destiny” or “community of a shared future for mankind”. There are a couple different ways of translating the Chinese phrase, but this is really, I think the best way to describe it is Xi Jinping’s vision for global order. The initiatives have been described as strategic, the strategic guidance for implementing that vision and turning it into a reality. So, it’s really about the wiring of the international system, about global governance, but just about how global politics is organized and to make it compatible with China’s vision and China’s priorities. So, in the case of the Global Security Initiative—maybe it’s helpful to give an example for one of these for your listeners—The Global Security Initiative is both the security pillar of the Community of Common Destiny, and Chinese scholars tell us it’s also the external projection of Xi Jinping’s comprehensive national security concept, which is this thing he announced in 2014. It’s his concept of how to make the Communist Party secure and safe in power at the top of China’s socialist system. So, it is a regime security concept, and the Global Security Initiative is the external projection of that. And Chinese scholars, sources, white papers are really clear that that’s what the Global Security Initiative is and what it’s doing for China’s national security strategy. Marcrum Maybe we can zoom out a little bit here and kind of start with the basics on it. You mentioned the Community of Common Destiny, and as the editor in chief of the Texas National Security Review, the Texas National Security Review paper by Liza Tobin is still kind of the standard about the Community of Common Destiny. Can you talk about briefly what is the Community of Common Destiny? What does Xi Jinping mean when he says that? And what are they trying to accomplish? Chestnut Greitens The Community of Common Destiny is really Xi Jinping’s vision for transforming global governance, right? And so, it’s got a kind of a funny English translation that sounds grandiose but, frankly, these concepts are pretty vague, especially when they first get announced in Chinese as well as in English. And so, I think, you know, for me, watching how we talk about the Community of Common Destiny and the Global Security Initiative, there’s been a little bit too much of a tendency to dismiss them as empty rhetoric, because this is how China makes policy, right? And maybe we’ll get into this later, but they start with slogans, and then the implementation often takes several years to fill in. That’s very unlike a policy rollout in the US context or, or European context. And so, when you hear a phrase like that and it seems important, but it’s fuzzy, it’s worth sort of saying, okay, what’s the principle or the vision? Because that’s what the Community of Common Destiny has been. It’s Xi Jinping’s vision for transforming the international environment to make it compatible with and friendly to China’s domestic governance model and China’s emergence as a global leader. And so, it’s a really central concept, and has been since the late 2010s, for China’s foreign policy framework and its overall national security strategy. It’s a way of building the new type of major power relations or new type of international relations that will facilitate China’s rejuvenation by 2049. And so, Xi Jinping, this is something Xi Jinping has been talking about as the guiding vision for China’s foreign policy for years now. Just to be clear, right, when you talk about the phrase community of common destiny, as with a lot of things in Chinese political discourse and political talk, Xi Jinping didn’t come up with the term. I think Hu Jintao has been using it since 2007, 2008. But Xi Jinping was the one in a speech in Moscow in, I think 2013, I’d have to check, to really bring it back and make it this central organizing principle of China’s foreign policy and China’s vision for how the world should run. And that vision is about making the world compatible with China’s approach to security for the party in power. And so, it’s really a way of articulating a vision of world order that makes the world safe and friendly to the Communist Party. Does that answer your question? Marcrum No, that absolutely does. You know, that’s really interesting— Chestnut Greitens And I will say, I think the Liza Tobin piece, I was not involved in in that particular TNSR piece. That was before my time. But I do think it’s a great read and would encourage everybody to go look it up at TNSR.org. Marcrum Yeah, it’s [a] fantastic piece and I still it’s still required reading here at the Army War College when we talk about, you know, community of shared—or the shared future for mankind, shared community of common destiny, however, we want to translate this phrase, it’s still the standard for it. But I think it’s an interesting point that you raise. And this is the, you know, one of the reasons I asked that question is a lot of times we hear from people that China is not really looking to change the world order. But then we have things like the Community of Common Destiny and these other things that in your paper you describe them as “mobilizational initiatives”. And you briefly talked about how they create this slogan, and then everything falls out below it. Can you talk a little bit more about that with the Global Security Initiative? And how is China implementing using the Global Security Initiative? How are they doing that to accomplish this new global world order? Chestnut Greitens Yeah, absolutely. So, I think this is a key point that’s led to some real misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the Global Security Initiative, because what, the way that the Global Security Initiative works, I think, is—and we have a paper coming out with two great colleagues, Isaac Kardon and Cameron Waltz, in China Quarterly that’s going to make this argument later this year—but the piece, in that piece we argue and, I think, show that China is a Leninist party state. And in the Leninist party state, you use mobilizational campaigns to pursue change. That’s actually there’s a long history of experts on China and on Leninist party, Communist party systems, looking at how you get policy change done in a system that’s run by a Communist party or a single party Leninist system. And these mobilizational campaigns, we call this campaign style governance. So, there’s a big slogan. The party sort of mobilizes everybody toward that goal. And mobilization governance has a couple of features. It is a strategy for change, right? So, first of all, that’s really clear from the process alone. And China, I will say, I don’t think there’s any debate that China wants to change global governance. When you read what they say about the four major initiatives, that’s very clear. One of them is a global governance initiative that talks about how global security governance has many inadequacies and must be reformed. Right? This is a case where I don’t think I think we can just take them at their word. They’re saying it and they’re doing it, and the rhetoric and the activities line up. And I think we need to be careful about what kind of change they mean and not mirror image and assume that they’re going to do it the same way we’re going to do it. But first...

2. 

   22 May 2026

   CLSC Dialogues – Ep 29 – Tom Spahr and General Xavier Brunson – “An Enviable Position in the Pacific”: An interview with General Xavier Brunson

   Guest host Tom Spahr and General Xavier Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea (UNC/CFC/USFK), discuss Korea, the Indo-Pacific, and mission command. Keywords: Korea, China, mission command Dr. Tom Spahr (Host) Welcome to CLSC Dialogues, a production of the China Landpower Studies at the US Army War College. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or the Department of War. I’m Dr. Tom Spahr, the Francis De Serio Chair of Strategic and Theater Intelligence here at the Army War College and your host for today’s conversation. This time each year, the Army War College hosts the Army’s annual Strategic Landpower Symposium to encourage professional dialogue on the role of Landpower in modern warfare. The keynote speaker for this year’s symposium is General Xavier Brunson, the commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea, the so-called Tri-Command. We are fortunate to have General Brunson with us today in the CLSC Dialogues studio. Before assuming command in December of 2024, General Brunson commanded at every subordinate level, including the US Army’s First Corps. Before that, the Army’s 7th Infantry Division, both focused on the Indo-Pacific theater. At the brigade level, he commanded the 525 Battlefield Surveillance Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. General Brunson is also a proud graduate of the US Army War College. General Brunson, welcome back to Carlisle Barracks, and thank you for joining us today on CLSC Dialogues. General Xavier Brunson Dr. Spahr, Tom, it’s it’s great to be with you again and thank you for the opportunity. Spahr So, sir, we had the opportunity to speak last year around this time. We did that one on A Better Peace, of the War Room podcast, and I’ll just refer listeners to that if they want more. But, I think it will be beneficial for listeners of this podcast to start with just a description of your command, the Tri-Command, as we call it in Korea. It is unique. And, can you just briefly describe why why it’s a tri-command and how that works? Brunson Yeah. You know, it’s interesting as you list out the commands that are the three that are that make up my job. It almost follows the way things would if something broke out. So, you have the United Nations Command, which maintains the armistice that’s truthfully at the front. And should the armistice fail, then you have the Combined Forces Command, which is the ROK-US alliance, and then you have United States Forces Korea, which is a representation of the US’s will to enforce, support, sustain a mutual defense treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States. It’s a Joint command. I’ve got a space component, a SOF component. I’ve got an air component, a maritime component. I’ve got a marine component and a land component represented by the only forward station field army in the United States military. So Eighth Army, so that’s what it is and how it functions is it functions as an example. For 75 years, it has stood in one shape, way, or form. And, I think that’s important. Spahr Now that’s great sir. It’s for the Army War College. You hit the Joint command. You are the only field army right in the in the in the US inventory. Let’s let’s jump into deterrence, though. So, when we talk about deterrence in the Pacific, that conversation, it also often gravitates towards naval and air capabilities because there’s a lot of blue on the on the map there. But you’re here for the Strategic Landpower Symposium. So, will you explain the role of persistent land-based presence specifically in Korea? And, how does Landpower on the Korean Peninsula deter in ways that the other domains just can’t? Brunson Yeah, I think that’s, you know, in my remarks today to the class, one of the things I talked about is Operation Epic Fury is taking advantage of things we’ve already done, particularly in Landpower, to set theaters. If you think about the bases that we’re utilizing right now, those are on ground that was seized by Landpower to establish those bases in much the same in Korea. When you look at our US Army bases that are forward, where you have Landpower forward positioned, I think a thing that we have to start talking about is what is credible. Do we have credible capabilities forward on that land? And, the United States Army is in an enviable position, more so than other services to have enviable Landpower stationed where it might act in the theater or, if nothing else, provides opportunities for our adversaries to say, maybe not today. And then, when you look across the region, there’s this woven network of Landpower that exists across the Pacific, that it’s the glue that holds it all together. When you look at 10 of the world’s largest armies, four to five of them sit in the Indo-Pacific, three of them are treaty allies. Those forces are led by army generals. And, those army generals tie that Landpower network together in a way that you will see nowhere else. Spahr Many of them graduates of the Army War College. Brunson Absolutely. They’re all there in the Hall of Fame. But, I think that that we oftentimes and as I mentioned to the class as well, we don’t have to give ourselves credit for doing this, but we ought to at least acknowledge that Landpower is the difference for other forces. Spahr Yes, sir. I couldn’t agree more. Here at the Army War College. You know, we talk a lot about strategic empathy or the task of understanding the enemy’s perspective. You challenged the audience today in your keynote address to view the competition in the Pacific East up by turning that map 90 degrees to the right, placing Korea right in the middle. And, then envisioning the theater from China’s perspective, can you describe what that perspective reveals to you? Brunson Yeah, Tom, you know, it’s it’s amazing when you look at it the other way. Like, I was always one of these people that was like, what are they so concerned about? There’s all kinds of gaps in those islands that they could just drive through, and they don’t have any problem with access to the greater Pacific. Well, they do in their mind, because of capabilities that might be resident on those landmasses and how it might impact their ability to transit smoothly. And so, when they when they look out from from the east coast of China, what they see is there’s Korea, the dagger in the heart of Asia, there’s Japan again, sort of that shield that’s sort of a backstop, if you will, for them trying and their ambitions beyond that into the South China Sea and then down to their southeast is the Philippines. And, when you start thinking about things that have been done, like Typhon missiles being in the Philippines, that shuts that area down, you know, there are risks that that they have to take on. But by the same token, we have to kind of look at ourselves and say, well, we’re in a pretty good position right now. You know, you’ve got that triangle that’s together. And, if we can sew that up into a kill web, if we can communicate, if we can see, sense, and understand the right way, what that’s going to provide for us is maybe to never have to go to war, because there’s there’s this palpable thing that exists there in alliance that they just can’t defeat. Now we are able to move into diplomacy. Now we’re able to have economic freedom. Maybe the Indo-Pacific does remain free and open because of just how real that threat could be to an adversary. And, and I think, though, that it starts with looking out and seeing what they see and understanding what they might take exception to and why. It wasn’t the fact that a capability was in the Philippines. It’s what that capability could do that placed them at, you know, considering that to be a threat. Spahr So, I want to come back a little bit to the allies and partners, but you trigger me on something there. When you mentioned kill web, you hear that term more and more. Now, what do you mean by a kill web? Brunson A web has different anchor points, a kill chain. I just imagine this chain link, this, you know, something that you would lock your bike up with. It’s got a beginning. It’s got an end. You bring it around, you throw a lock on it. The kill web requires others to be a part of it so that you can achieve enviable effects. Right? You might not be the best sensor. You might not be able to see best. You might not be able to sense best. You might not even be able to act decisively. But, that net brings together a lot of things, right? It changes magazine depth because you can use a variety of different shooters. It changes the way that we understand our operating environment. It changes the shape of the operating environment. It could morph because we’re not just anchored to a single point. We’re developing this web. There’s efficiencies in that as well. And, I don’t know that we ever think about efficiency and combat, but there are efficiencies there and that you don’t have to do it all by yourself. And, it’s also very phalanx-like, because now we’re standing with someone else to achieve the effect we’re after for those allies and partners. Spahr Come into that you talk about. And it’s funny, no matter, you know, no matter what political party’s in power in our country, they all consistently emphasize that importance of the allies and the partners. And, you talk about the strategic triangle there of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Is there anything else you want to elaborate on on the importance of those countries? Brunson Well, I think that what we find is, is that yo...

3. 

   14 May 2026

   CLSC Dialogues – Ep 28 – COL Kyle Marcrum and Dr. Jessica Liao – Taiwan’s Special Defense Budget and KMT Trip to Beijing, Part 2

   In part two of this two-part episode, COL Kyle Marcrum and Dr. Jessica Liao discuss Taiwan President Lai’s special defense budget and the Kuomingdang Chair, Cheng Li-wun, visit to Beijing. Keywords: Taiwan, defense, budget COL Kyle Marcrum Welcome back to the CLSC Dialogues, a production of the China Landpower Studies Center at the United States Army War College. The opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, United States Army War College, or the US government. I'm Colonel Kyle Marcrum, director of the China Landpower Studies Center, and I'm again joined by Doctor Jessica Liao. We are picking up part two of our conversation on President Lai’s special defense budget. Last time we ended with Jessica raising Cheng's visit to China. And I'm glad you raised Cheng’s visit to Beijing, Cheng Li-wun, the chair of the KMT, just traveled against this whole backdrop. And I want to emphasize that this is an ever-increasing complexity where we have Legislative Yuan, the president's trying to pass this special defense budget. The Legislative Yuan is split on it. Dr. Jessica Liao Yeah. Marcrum President Trump and General Secretary Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet. It was postponed. And then in the meantime, the KMT chair travels to Beijing and meets with Xi Jinping. What do you think was the objective of that visit? Liao Yeah. There are several unique things, and also the objective that you talk about that is tied into this visit. Let’s start was like Cheng Li-wun herself. She's a very unique individual and like, you know, come from a very complex like political background. She actually started as the pro-independence movement player, like, you know, a part of the whole, like they call it Tangwai, the outside party alluding to KMT party, the movement, you know, before the Taiwan democracies. And so being the member of the DPP and then in 2005, she shifted from DPP to KMT. And in the recent years, she started to move into a very more of the pro-Beijing kind of stance within the whole KMT, like, you know, political candidates that was trying to jockeying for the new chairmanship. And really, she's coming from nowhere. It's just like, you know, a couple months ago, like she suddenly like, you know, rise to the center. And the reason that she was able to rise up so quickly, a lot of people, you know, speculated that Beijing had helped, but we don't have direct evidence on that. But she does have a lot of support from especially those like pro-Beijing stance veterans who still want to see a unified China and have a more stronger ideational like, you know, convergence with Beijing. And it's kind of like, you know, pan-Chinese, kind of like, yeah, identities. So those like, voters within KMTs are really like, you know, diehard supporters for Cheng Li-wun’s rise. And so she kind of like, just like, you know, shock everybody and then become the rising figures of this KMT chairman elections. So she went there. And it's very different from all the previous like KMT leaders to visit to Beijing. So the last time that KMT leaders like, met with the Beijing leadership was like a decade ago, that was Ma Ying-jeou, who was already there, and long standing KMT leadership. So she is really brand new, doesn't really have that kind of like foundation, like what all her predecessors are when they were meeting with Beijing. So in that sense, Beijing is also taking a gamble on her, right? Because she does not have that kind of like, you know, solid foundations within her party, that she just took the leadership. And on the other hand, because of this kind of like, complicated political background. I think the polls has showing that people, the public are not very, you know, trusting her political credential, like seeing her more as a, you know, a chameleon. So, you know, and, but she want to make a point about William Lai’s approach is wrong. And instead, this kind of peaceful approach and a more pro-Beijing kind of stance is a way to go and to be able to seek a peaceful coexistence with Beijing. Marcrum Which is interesting because I don't know if you saw the AI video that's making its rounds on social media, where, Cheng is at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial and he comes to life and he's like, “All right, China's united?” And she's like, “No.” And so then Chiang Kai-shek goes and beats President Lai with his cane. So it kind of it kind of goes behind this idea that, you know, a united China or she's part of this united China idea. But I also wanted to point out that, you know, she's like you said, she's new to the movement, or to the KMT, fairly new. But she met with Xi Jinping. I believe it was the—and this is where I'm going to show my ignorance of anything that's outside of China and Taiwan—it was I believe it was the United Kingdom. Their prime minister went to China and Xi Jinping, did not meet with him. Was it was it the UK? I'll have to look that up. It was a European leader. It was UK or may have been. . . somebody went to China and did a tour of China, but Xi Jinping did not meet with them. Liao I think. Yeah, you are right. There is a European leader recently I believe is the yeah. Marcrum Believe it was UK. Liao Right, yeah. Marcrum But it's the idea that Xi Jinping, a, you know, a country that is like China that is very focused on protocol and a national leader comes and does not meet with Xi Jinping. Then at the same time, we have KMT, who is a political party in what China believes to be a breakaway province, travels, and Xi Jinping does meet with her. So what idea was Xi Jinping trying to show? It becomes another question. One of the things I was also really curious about because Chen Li-wun, when she was in China, she mentioned the 92 Consensus multiple times. Liao That's right. Marcrum But when I was in Taiwan, it seemed like the, you know, the 92 non—what was it?—the non-consensus consensus, like people were saying. So for people not familiar the 92 Consensus was that there was one China but kind of ambiguous on who runs it. Right? But then, so, but that became was becoming less popular, particularly with the youth in Taiwan who identify themselves as Taiwans or Taiwanese versus Chinese-Taiwan or Taiwan. So she, but she mentioned it multiple times. Was her, I mean, I guess it goes back to this unified China idea. Is she trying to identify more with that? Does she think that she can rally a KMT behind that, or what do you think she's trying to do with that? Liao Right. So yeah, the KMT, the Nationalist Party and also CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, they went way back to like early 20th Century. So this party, like this two party have like a very long standing relationship that they, you know, coalesce throughout, you know, the before, before 1949 when the PRC was born. And they and they still tried to carry that kind of like tradition on to say like we are still in many ways, you know, all started from like Sun Yat-sen, who was the founder of the Nationalist Party, but also a big advocate to say, let's accommodate the Communist Party inside the party movement, because after all, we are all nationalists and we all want to see a unified China in front of the whole, you know, colonial pressures and so on. So I think there is a long tradition ever since 2005, when the KMT chairman, then Lien Chan, you know, visited Beijing, they had that kind of historical connections in or imagination, if you will, to really try to revitalize that kind of like, you know, linkage, like nationalist linkage. And I think Cheng Li-wun’s trip was trying to like, carry that kind of like historical memory in order to like, you know, enhance her legitimacy. That she is the one that, you know, like, received the torch from her, you know, predecessors. And part of this kind of like, you know, tradition continuing is to reassert her support for the 92 Consensus. And the 92 Consensus, of course, it started from 1992. That was basically the both sides have this like first official statement after the Cold War talking about, you know, we are all China, but whether you want to interpret it as the PRC China, People's Republic of China in Beijing or the ROC China, Republic of China in Taipei, that is a respected interpretation that both sides can do their own justification, and we are not going to pick on those. So it's sort of like an unwritten political fudge that you, you know, you're giving the wiggling room for both sides to make it. So it's in many ways like very politically, you know, genius kind of arrangement. However, after Xi came into power as the CCP leadership, he is no longer a, you know, tolerating so much wiggling room. He's increasingly insisting on taking away the second part of the 92 Consensus. There is no respected interpretation of 92. China is one China, and that is the PRC China, and Taiwan is part of it. So a lot of people believe that, you know, Cheng Li-wun during her trip, she also reiterated her insistence to go back to the 92 Consensus as the baseline for the both sides to start a dialog. But what is being dinged on by a lot of Taiwanese is that she is also staying away from reiterating the respected interpretation, like all the previous KMT officials do. So a lot of people believe that she is siding with, you know, Beijing on the different interpretation, kind of, is increasingly become the PRC-dominated interpretation. Nonetheless, on the event of her visit to Sun Yat-sen’s memorial, she did spill out ROC Republic of China. But she say it in the way as like, you know, this is the history where the ROC was bor...

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