Pacific Polarity

About Pacific Polarity

Facilitating dialogue on the Indo-Pacific region, exploring diverse viewpoints on governance, geopolitics, and historical trends. pacificpolarity.substack.com (https://pacificpolarity.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast)

Publisher

Jersey Lee and Richard Gray

Category

government · news

Language

en

Explicit

No

First episode

3 Feb 2025

Latest episode

6 Sept 2026

Latest episodes

40 episodes in the feed.

1. 

   6 Sept 2026

   Gabriela Bernal: The Unfinished Story of Two Koreas

   Jersey Lee Welcome to this episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we’re speaking with Dr. Gabriela Bernal. She is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a non-resident fellow at the European Center for North Korean Studies. She is also an associated research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy. She has a PhD from the University of North Korean Studies and has published work in various media and online outlets. Dr. Bernal, great to have you on. Gabriela Bernal Thanks for having me. Jersey Lee The major recent news—part of the reason why we’re even speaking at this moment—was Trump’s Truth Social announcement last month, stating that due to his great relationship with Kim Jong-un, as well as South Korea’s lack of help against Iran, America scaled down the joint Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise with South Koreans. Was this intended as an olive branch towards North Korea leverage against South Korea, or something else, or some mix of that, what’s the mix in your mind? Gabriela Bernal I think definitely Trump is trying to get back on Kim Jong-un’s good side. I think it was relevant for a few reasons. Because Trump has said since he came back to office, he said on multiple occasions that he’s interested in meeting Kim Jong-un and that he’s open to talking with him, and he’s spoken a lot about their good relationship. But this is the first time that Trump really backed up those words with some kind of action, with something tangible beyond just words. So I think in that sense, it is notable. It sends a message to North Korea, yes, that Trump is interested in keeping the tensions lower. And specifically, I thought it was interesting that he mentioned how the drills are seen are a hostile signal to Pyongyang; because he didn’t have to say that, he could have just ended it with, “South Korea didn’t help us with Iran and they’re not helping us, and therefore why should we help, why should we invest so much money with you guys in terms of these joint military exercises”, he could have just ended it in terms of criticizing South Korea and left that way. But the fact that he brought in North Korea specifically, and pretty much echoed what Kim Jong-un and North Korean leaders have been saying for so many years about the drills being exercises for war and very hostile—he used that same kind of vocabulary that North Korea uses. And I thought that’s very notable because that shows definitely it’s not just about perhaps punishing Seoul for not cooperating so much on Ukraine or Iran; that’s partly it, but it is more a message to North Korea, so yeah, an olive branch, I think it is. Now, whether North Korea will accept that olive branch, that remains to be seen. But, yeah, I do think Trump, especially seeing how things are not going his way in the Middle East, in Europe, with Ukraine, maybe North Korea could be his last kind of hope for a major foreign policy achievement before he leaves office. So he might really switch his focus more on North Korea in the near future. Jersey Lee Like the Nobel Peace Prize, you mean? Gabriela Bernal I’m sure he would love that. He tried during his first term. In practice, I don’t think that’s going to happen. But we’ll see. Because really, it’s not that much up to Trump now, unlike last time. Last time was very different. The tables have turned significantly since his first term. I think Trump or the US, they don’t hold all the cards anymore. Now, North Korea is not nearly as vulnerable or weak or isolated as it was back in 2017, 2018. So even if Trump shouts and screams that he wants to have diplomacy with North Korea and resume talks with Kim or even hold a summit, it doesn’t mean that North Korea is going to accept it. Jersey Lee As someone who only casually observes peninsula affairs—I’m referring to myself—it seems that no matter what South Korea or the US does or says, North Korea has over the past few decades remained implacably hostile, at least in its public statements. Could anything, including President Trump or South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s efforts change this dynamic and get North Korea to show some more diplomatic flexibility than they have previously? Gabriela Bernal I think from the outside, that is how it usually looks, because North Korea always has these very dramatic rhetoric and statements that they make, with the vocabulary that they use, it’s always very extreme. But in practice, in the past, North Korea has been diplomatically flexible on multiple occasions. We’ve seen it during the 90s. We’ve seen it during the six party talks and we’ve seen it during inter-Korean talks under multiple administrations, and most recently under Trump’s first term. The very fact that they would engage in in such diplomacy, and really they did bring concessions to the table to the US. So it’s hard to say that they have not been completely—that they have not been flexible at all. But of course, they hold their cards closely, because again, the Korean Peninsula is technically still at war. So the war is still ongoing. The United States is on paper still North Korea’s main enemy, and it represents a real existential threat to North Korea. So they can’t afford to be too flexible or open, unlike maybe other countries, because—this thinking has been reconfirmed again and again over the decades by the U.S.’s foreign policy, and especially its wars in the Middle East and deposing of dictators and all of that. And most recently in Iran, it’s been confirmed to North Korea repeatedly that they can’t fully trust the U.S. and they cannot afford to just negotiate away their nuclear weapons without getting a significant concrete security guarantee in exchange. To your point about what could make them more flexible, or make them resume diplomacy in a serious way, I think it’s the same thing that they’ve been looking for since the beginning. North Korea has always been looking for the same things. That has not changed. Their goals have remained much the same for over the decades. Namely, they need a security guarantee to guarantee the survival of the regime. And I think for them, they concluded early on that the only way this would be possible is if they had nuclear weapons. History has proven them quite correct, if we look at so many examples of other countries. So I think for now, in the current context, the main thing for the beginning—what would make Kim Jong-un want to go back to talks—it would have to be a significant change in the U.S. position, because the U.S. position on North Korea has remained much the same across administrations, despite there having been attempts at diplomacy here and there, attempts under Trump last time, under Obama, under Bush, during the six-party talks. But overall, the position on CVID, Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization, that issue—and it has softened a bit in recent years because of how things have changed so rapidly. I think the U.S. knows that in practice it is not possible to start negotiations on that basis, from that footing of CVID, it is not going to work anymore. I mean, it wasn’t going to work in the past; it’s definitely not going to work now. So I think the first thing would be to put that to the side. It doesn’t mean to abandon denuclearization, because ultimately the goal should remain a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the whole peninsula, for the safety and security, not just of the Koreas, but of the region and the wider world, and to prevent further nuclear proliferation, which is already a threat in the region and beyond. I think for those reasons, that’s very important. And whether the US, mainly, is willing to change its position publicly on deferring denuclearization in favor of an arms control centered approach, and also somehow, somewhat, in some way recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. Now, does that mean officially making a giant speech and saying that, OK, we, as the United States, we recognize North Korea as a nuclear state? No, no, no. But we can see that it’s kind of already going in that direction. If we look at Russia and China, China has been, of course, very silent, but that silence speaks volumes. Unlike Russia, which has said North Korea is not going to give up its weapons, it shouldn’t be a bargaining chip and pretty much de facto recognizing its nuclear status, China has not gone that far, but they have also not brought up the issue in recent meetings or in recent documents, which is also very noteworthy, because historically China has been very supportive of denuclearization and consistently mentioned it always in public statements. Trump has said multiple times already in during the second term, referring to North Korea as a nuclear state in passing. So not in an official statement kind of way. But I think by now, since 2006, since the first nuclear test and now we’re 20 years after that first nuclear test, is it not time now for us to finally reckon with the reality that, yeah, North Korea is a nuclear weapons state? That’s not ideal and we don’t want that; ideally, they would give up their nuclear weapons. But for many, many reasons, they won’t. So the only way I think negotiations can take place in a way that has actual hope of being sustainable and for long term cooperation and progress to be made—and not just very easily reversible progress like in the past, for something to actually stick and to be able to be carried on across administrations and worked on—I think the basis of that needs to be a de facto recognition that, yeah, North Korea is a nuclear state, and now how are we going to deal with it, instead of how are we going to get them to give up their nuclear weapons. Because that premise is—I think it’s too late for that. Jersey Lee Going back to the statement we started off with, South Korean President Lee’s response was pretty interesting in that he welcomed it, framing it as aligning with his own peace initiative. I think many people saw this as a smart move to diminish the leverage that Trump thought he could hold over South Korea, but some have criticized President Lee for further harming the alliance and drifting away from America, perhaps towards China. What do you think? Gabriela Bernal First of all, it’s important to understand South Korea has one of the most complex, difficult geographic positions in the world, which makes its geopolitical environment extremely challenging, because it is in between all these major powers, China, Japan, the United States. And throughout history, it’s been the same thing. South Korea cannot choose one or the other. It just can’t, even if it would want to, it can’t. So it can’t take on a policy as, for example, Japan, which has been much more willing to take an openly pro-US stance. For Japan, that’s been the case, but for South Korea, it’s just not that feasible because, as we know, for security, they rely immensely on the United States, and for their economy, immense inter-connectedness with China. That’s one thing. And so South Korea always tries to—or usually tries to pursue a balanced foreign policy between the two superpowers. Now, of course, this changed during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, where it went way more pro-US, but now under Lee, the progressive government is trying to recalibrate that foreign policy again in a more balanced way. Regarding the Trump statements and Lee Jae-myung’s reaction, it’s a pretty calibrated, balanced and strategic reaction, because of course, in practice, South Korea knows that it is being sidelined—as it has often been in the past in many of these situation—It is being somewhat sidelined; diplomacy between Kim Jong-un and Trump is likely—if it does resume—it is likely to resume more in a bilateral format than with South Korea as a mediator. Unlike during 2018, 2019 under the Moon Jae-in administration, South Korea has lost a lot of that leverage. With the whole two hostile state policy of North Korea, they will not be interested in South Korea playing any role in diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea. So South Korea is aware that it has lost a lot of leverage. And yet, it is aware of its international security priorities and its goals, one of those goals being improved inter-Korean relations and improved U.S.-North Korea relations, as that adds to overall Korean Peninsula security in the long term. I think, at least for now, the only way to get to those goals is to promote or at least allow U.S.-North Korea diplomacy to play out, however that might look like. So if South Korea would come in between now and demand a more active role, or demand to be involved in every single step of diplomacy, it would be quite counterproductive, because North Korea would see that as a very unwanted move, and for the US, it would also trouble things. So I think South Korea is just taking a step back, not because they don’t care about the situation—Of course, they care immensely about the situation—but because they know that this is a very unique situation where these two leaders have this personal relationship that was cultivated during Trump’s first term, and it’s the highest chance in years for diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea to resume. So they don’t really want to sabotage that. I think that it’s a pragmatic approach. Lee Jae-myung has branded his foreign policy as pragmatic foreign policy, right? Well, I think this is one example of him being very pragmatic. It’s not the ideal position for Seoul to be in, but it is the reality. And I think it’s the right move. Jersey Lee I remember that U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby, called South Korea a model ally earlier this year. Why have things changed so dramatically? And I also understand that President Lee Jae-myung, like all previous Korean presidents, face a very hostile opposition under the very partisan political atmosphere that South Korea always has. How are his opponents, domestic political opponents, thinking about the alliance with America? Do they just blame President Lee for everything wrong with it? Or do they also recognize how chaotic American foreign policy has become, such that you can have it be a model ally, and then suddenly very bad and whatever. Gabriela Bernal South Korean domestic politics is an entirely... very complicated thing. But yes, in general—of course, there are outliers—But in general, the conservative camp has been historically much more pro U.S., pro U.S. alliance and very advocating for things like military drills and closer cooperation with the U.S., and then more most recently closer cooperation, trilateral cooperation involving Japan, the U.S. and South Korea. And yeah, there is a tendency to blame issues, especially related to the alliance, to the incumbent administration, especially if it’s a progressive leaning administration, as is currently the case; it’s an easy scapegoat, right? It’s an easy way to push all of the blame and the problems on one president. But of course, like you said, it’s much more complicated than that. Of course, this has predated Lee Jae-myung. If anything, complicating a lot of things on the peninsula, it was the former administration and the entire martial law episode. So that was a big deal too. I think, yeah, it’s one of the main big problems in South Korea, because each president only has one five-year term, which is extremely limited and difficult to make lasting change, because there has been this trend, if we look at across administrations in South Korea, that whatever policies one government made, especially related to North Korea or a lot of foreign policy issues, are often reversed by the time the next president comes along. On North Korean issues, it’s very, very counterproductive because it doesn’t allow for a stable, consistent foundation for engagement, or just even any kind of central South Korean policy toward North Korea. I think that’s a big problem because conservatives view it one way and then the progressives view it another way. The only thing they must agree on is the unification goal because it’s written in the Constitution. But everything else, like how to get to unification, that is completely, very, very different for both these camps. So the bipartisan divide in South Korea is extremely strong, it’s very palpable and does not bode well for any kind of long-term progress on these very difficult issues. The current administration will be doing the best it can in terms of promoting its very different goals. It’s very difficult because now we’re at this point where on the one hand, they want a more independent military posture because they are aware of uncertainties regarding the US alliance and the commitment to South Korea security. But then on the other hand, they also really want to resume diplomacy with North Korea. And those two goals are very hard to reconcile. It would be a difficult position for any president to be in. It’s very simplified to just say, because it’s a liberal or progressive president, that’s why these things are happening. No. The geopolitical forces at play now are so much vaster than any one person or any one party. I think that’s something that the next administration, even if it is conservative, they will have to deal with it as well. Jersey Lee Just sticking with Korean domestic politics for a moment, how do conservatives think about the foreign policy legacy—particularly in relation to the alliance with the U.S.—How do they think about Park Chung-hee, who did not trust the Americans and tried to get a nuclear weapon? And for that matter, how do progressives think about this legacy, that part of his legacy in terms of its relationship to what Korea is thinking through right now? Gabriela Bernal This is a very sensitive topic in South Korea. And again, I’m generalizing, but in general, especially in over the past decade, there has been a movement among conservative groups, especially far right conservative groups, that have revived this idolization of these figures like Park Chung-hee and like Syngman Rhee. That has been met with very, very strong responses by the more left-wing camp. Because on the one hand, you have these... I’ll give you a personal example. My in-laws are conservative leaning. In their mind, because they grew up—like my father-in-law, he was born in 1956, so three years after the Korean War, the ceasefire—so for them, for that generation, Park Chung-hee was like a savior, and I can to an extent understand where they’re coming from, if I put myself in their position. There was no food to eat—I’ve heard a lot of these stories from my father-in-law—There was no food to eat, it was a very poor country at the time; overpopulation, lack of infrastructure, just completely—South Korea was so poor, very, very poor. It’s almost unimaginable now for us to think of South Korea as one of the poorest nations at the time, in the 50s and 60s. And so for them, Park Chung-hee was the strong leader that the country needed. And he made the difficult decisions that got the country to develop rapidly—the miracle on the Han River—to develop rapidly, to really become a strong country that can stand up to North Korea and to anyone, and really to—not erase, but really overcome a lot of what it had lost during the Korean War, and also before that, during the colonial period, South Korea had been through a lot. Now, one of the reasons why a lot of more progressives don’t see people like Park Chung-hee in a very positive light is because one, of course, all the human rights abuses and human rights incidents that happened during his rule, but also because of his links to Japan, to the Japanese colonial period and his background. But I think that is somewhat—I don’t know if forgiven is the right word—but somewhat neglected by the conservative camp, and more to what he did for the economy, to make South Korea a strong economic country, and modernization of South Korea in such a short period of time. His normalization of relations with Japan, that was a big move towards getting a lot of investment, and towards getting a lot of that capital needed to modernize the country. So if you hear it from people like that, like my in-laws, they will tell you that without Park Chung-hee, South Korea would be a third world country today. That’s literally what they say. I don’t know, maybe, perhaps; we can only speculate. Of course, his policies did help South Korea economically, but at what cost, right? A tremendous human cost. I think nowadays, that schism, that divide, it continues, not just about history, but until today—simple example, Japan-South Korea relations. There are many conservatives—if not most, I think a lot—many conservatives, at least, believe South Korea and Japan should have closer relations, they should improve their relations, they’re neighbors, they need to work together. From a pragmatic point of view, that is true, they should lean more on each other in terms of security, especially with the U.S. becoming less and less reliable. But then the progressives will come and make note of issues such as, well, we cannot forget what Japan did during the colonial period, and what they have yet to seriously apologize for—because they have made apologies in the past, but then Japanese leaders continue to visit Yasukuni Shrine and things like that. So I don’t know what will be enough for—That’s the question, what does Japan have to do to really earn this portion of South Korean population’s trust back? And how important do they see that? Do they even think that’s necessary? So these are issues that seem very domestic, but they have repercussions for security of the peninsula and regional security, and therefore U.S. policy and Chinese policy in the region. So, yeah, I forgot what the question was, but it’s very complicated. Jersey Lee I guess I wanted to ask specifically—I’m aware that Korean progressives and conservatives, one of their big differences is over history—But the reason why I specified Park Chung-hee is because, as a conservative, his policy towards America is actually kind of reversed. He’s probably much more skeptical of America, or as skeptical of America as many progressives today. And he also tried to get a nuclear weapon for South Korea. So I’m wondering how—maybe this is an even more sensitive topic in that neither side wants to—like the progressives don’t want to say, oh, let’s copy Park Chung-hee, and the conservatives don’t want to bring this up either. Gabriela Bernal That’s definitely a good point. As we’ve seen in recent years, especially under the previous administration, there has definitely been a major increase in not just the public, but also the conservative camp calls for building an independent nuclear deterrent. I think the framing of it, though, is important, because some will openly say that, we need to have this because the U.S... I think the framing is usually toward North Korea, that North Korea poses this significant threat to us. And if they have nuclear weapons, we should have nuclear weapons, too, especially after what happened with Ukraine and how rapidly North Korea’s military’s capabilities have grown in just a few years. I think South Korea, regardless of the U.S. alliance, I think South Korea is just realizing that, is this enough? What we have now, is it enough? Now, the difference, I don’t think all the conservatives would frame it in the sense of, oh, we should pursue nuclear weapons because we can’t trust the U.S. I don’t think they would frame it that way necessarily. What I’ve heard is, for example, nuclear weapons would just make the alliance stronger, it would make South Korea a stronger partner in the alliance with the United States. And it would be an addition to the alliance. It would make it for a better partnership, a more fair partnership. So I think it’s a lot of question of framing. Definitely, we can see parallels, because the reason Park Chung-hee went after nuclear, or tried to go after nuclear weapons at the time, was because he saw the U.S. commitment as not totally ironclad, as they say. And I think even if they don’t state it explicitly, we are in a similar situation today. So it just depends, I guess, who would be in government. I think now in 2026, it’s much harder actually go after nuclear weapons in a covert way without anyone noticing, without the U.S. noticing, as compared to in the 70s, during Park Chung-hee’s time. That’s the challenge. I don’t think they could do it secretly. They definitely have the technological capabilities, just like Japan does. They could make one relatively quickly, they have almost everything they need, I think. But to make it covertly, that would be almost impossible. But yeah, we are in similar times, for sure. Again, the main crux of the issue is the uncertainty over the U.S. commitment to defending South Korea. Jersey Lee Something I’ve been interested in is in the idea of Sadaejuui, where Korea historically deferred to its great power friend in matters of diplomacy, ideology, political system, etc. This role was historically played by China; looking to today, it seems that North Korea has maneuvered itself away from relying on a single great power, while, especially when the conservatives are in power, it seems like they want the U.S. to be the modern version of their great and powerful friend, although as you say, President Lee may be trying to shift things back from that. So how do the two Koreas perceive the legacy and modern relevance of Sadaejuui? Gabriela Bernal I think it’s something that remains relevant till today in South Korea. The values and principles related to democracy and the values that the United States historically has stood for are still very strongly embedded in South Korea and South Korea’s constitution in the way South Korean democracy is run. A perfect example of this was during the martial law declaration under Yoon Suk-yeol, how immediately and the amount of people that stormed the National Assembly building, that show of South Korean democratic strength. Same thing during the Gwangju uprising, the student protests. So I think South Korea has an extremely strong heart of democracy, very strong history of fighting for those values. That is till today a very, very critical part of South Korea. And I think that doesn’t change just because of one president like Trump. Trump may talk a certain way about allies and about America first, etc. But it’s still not enough. One person is not enough to erase—Of course, he does a lot of damage and he’s done a lot of damage—But one person is not enough to erase everything, all those values and principles that the U.S. has built and stood for for decades. So that’s for South Korea. For North Korea, that’s a bit more complicated. Yes, because North Korea has from the start, practically, tried to play off its biggest neighbors, Russia and China, play them off against each other and extract as many concessions from both of them. And really, we see it in Juche, in North Korean ideology, it’s a mix of everything. So it is not completely the socialist style of either China or socialism as it is classically understood. It has a lot of components of socialism and communism from Russia and China, but it has its own unique characteristics, not least the whole focus on the idolization of the leader. That’s one thing that is very, very important in North Korea. I think ideology has been, maybe in the beginning, I think it was much more important during Kim Il-sung’s time, ideology played a big role in galvanizing the people. And they had a common enemy, the United States, and they had strong, strong partners, China and the Soviet Union, with a common ideology. And I think that ideological basis was very powerful during Kim Il-sung. I think that was during that time. But if we look now, during Kim Jong-un, there’s been a lot less emphasis on ideology, on this historical ideology. I think in a way, it has become a bit more pragmatic as well. We just see the same trend and tendency of North Korea to pick and choose whatever fits with their own goals and then call it whatever they want to call it, Juche or self-reliance. don’t think North Korea—and it’s always been the case—North Korea does not want to be seen as like a vassal state of China or of the Soviet Union or of Russia. It does not want to be seen as a dependent state, it wants to be seen as its own strong power, independent, sovereign; they always talk about sovereignty, and we see it played out now under Kim Jong-un, in how he’s very effectively been playing Beijing and Moscow, trying to extract a lot of concessions from each. So even though North Korea does remain extremely dependent economically on China—Despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite all the arms sales to Russia, still North Korea is very dependent on China, and China is by far its main economic lifeline—It will never want to portray itself as such. So it’s not like South Korea that proudly speaks of all of these values and celebrates a lot of the U.S. alliance, the U.S.-South Korea alliance and South Korea; through imagery as well, all these summits between U.S. and South Korean leaders. And that’s a big thing here. But in North Korea, it’s always been about the North Korean leader individually, that person, the Kim family; not the Kim family’s ties to this country or that country or this leader. In that sense, the ideology was much more relevant before. Even now, if we look at the documents from the Party Congress earlier this year and other documents that we’ve been seeing from North Korea, coming out over the past three to four years under Kim Jong-un, there has been much less mention of ideology, especially of his predecessors. I think really for North Korea, the focus has and will remain on the leader specifically. Jersey Lee North Korea’s growing relationship with Russia has not just helped it increase its diplomatic room and military capabilities, but also apparently being an economic boom, at least based on media reports. How significant and widespread has the economic windfall been for like North Koreans generally? On the other hand, I remember reading in 2024 speculation that growing number of North Koreans in Russia, whether it’s on the front line with Ukraine or whether it’s in Russian factories or wherever, may introduce an element of political uncertainty for the Kim regime, because these people, they would be more exposed to the outside world—Even though it’s Russia, it’s much bigger than North Korea. So how has Kim managed the risk and benefit? Gabriela Bernal How he has managed it, I think the details of that are known only to North Korea inside North Korea. We don’t know the details of that, but I definitely think it’s true what you say, it’s a double-edged sword for North Korea, this whole Russian economic boom. It’s a double-edged sword because on the one hand, yes, he does get that diplomatic clout that’s a much stronger international position, much more leverage over the US, over South Korea and all the money, the billions and billions that have reportedly come in through arms sales. So that those are all pros. But then there are cons, like you said, because it’s impossible to completely seal off an entire country from the outside world, no matter how hard you try. And in North Korea, this is a very perfect example, because they have tried from the very beginning to really keep the country as close as possible, the people as indoctrinated with propaganda as possible. And that remains central to the government survival to this day. It’s very important because, of course, if North Koreans would know, if they had access to the Internet, if they had access to outside information about what’s going on in the outside world or how people live in other countries, how long could the Kim family survive? But I think they survive through a lot of different strategies, because North Koreans are not oblivious to the outside world, especially since the 90s, the famine of the 90s. Ever since then, the amount of smuggling that began taking place since then, and the markets, a lot of outside information was able to come in. So I think North Koreans, if you look at the testimonies by North Korean escapees that are compiled every year by South Korean government and research institutions, we see all these testimonies that so many North Koreans have watched dramas and all that. Yet still, then the important question is, but if so many people know about the outside world through these movies or music or videos, why don’t they revolt against the government? And yeah, it’s difficult to answer that, but the government just has a very strong control in terms of security control over the people that makes it very difficult. The North Koreans that are going to work in Russia in factories and restaurants, that has definitely increased in recent years. A lot of people from North Korea have been sent to Russia. A lot of them have been sent under student visas. But when they’re sent there, their entire families pretty much in North Korea are kept as like hostages. They know that if someone defects, that they’re going to either kill your family or send them to a labor camp or some terrible fate. So that is a huge deterrent for the majority of North Koreans to not defect. Still, some do defect, but the majority will not because they know that they have family there, and if they leave, their entire family and sometimes even generations below, like people that are not even directly like immediate family, like mother, father, child, even cousins, sometimes they’re all sent to these labor camps or prison camps. And I think that is a major deterrent for North Koreans not to defect, even though they have access to the outside world. It might in the long term. We won’t know now. It’s too soon to say now. But all of these people that are in Russia now in these years, 2024, 2025, and maybe in the next few years, when they go, they’ll go back to North Korea. And when they go back to North Korea, they won’t be the same people as when they first left. And what does that mean? What will they do with that information that they have with that experience that they gained? I think that’s a very interesting question. I guess it depends on how many, because the more people have such experiences and the more people are to act on this newfound desire for freedom and change, the higher the chance that something could happen in North Korea. But I think for now it’s too soon to say, but for Kim Jong-un, it’ll be interesting to see if he does keep sending more and more people, because every person he sends is a danger. Yes, they bring money in for the government now, but in the long term, you don’t know which one of those people might come back and actually plot something. It’s very possible. So that’s interesting. Jersey Lee Going back to the benefit, because that was mostly about the risk, apparently there’s a big economic boom in North Korea, not just from Russian cash, but also from various IT cyber scams and whatever. Looking at the economic side, Is the money just going into the North Korean government? Do ordinary peoples feel any difference? How is it manifesting itself, all this supposed money? Gabriela Bernal From what we’ve seen and the limited information that we have, the majority of the money does seem to go to the military, to weapons and modernizing the military capabilities. But Kim Jong-un has also invested and is continuing to invest significantly in domestic projects separate from the military, such as construction and medical facilities, agriculture, education. There have been a lot of projects in recent years, which would arguably then benefit the local people eventually. I do think that’s noteworthy. So it’s not all about the military, because Kim Jong-un, I think he realizes that the people, the quality of life matters now more than it did perhaps under his predecessors. People are not as blindly going to just follow if the government cannot provide for them. So the more the government can provide them with their basic needs and also with maybe a bit extra than basic, the greater the loyalty that it will inspire in people. At least that’s what the logic would be. If you look at especially the cities like Pyongyang, definitely the pictures that we’ve gotten from tourists, especially Russian tourists, the photos that they have and videos that they’ve taken, are really surprising of how modern it looks, like they have their versions of Uber, and all these QR code ordering, and all these restaurants and all these skyscrapers. And of course, the difference between the rest of the country and the capital is still large. But from the beginning, Kim Jong-un has always emphasized the importance of closing that gap or at least narrowing that gap by investing in the provinces, which he has done and continues to, there are plans to continue to do that. So I think the money that is coming in from Russia, some of it is reaching the local populations. But still, of course, the disproportionate amount will go back to the regime and the military. Jersey Lee Thinking about all this foreign currency that is coming to North Korea, how do they even use it? Because they’re supposed to be under a lot of sanctions, right? Even though Russia presumably has stopped enforcing many sanctions, most other countries, if you want to trade with North Korea, if you don’t try to smuggle goods from the China-North Korea border, then you have to ship them by sea. And we’ve seen recently satellite photos of ship-to-ship transfer of sanctions evasion goods and whatnot. So number one, is that just how that works, they would use foreign currency to buy stuff that’s smuggled into North Korea? Why can’t South Korea and Japan or the U.S. just stop this? We can see it on satellite. Why can’t we just stop it? Gabriela Bernal First of all, a lot of these transfers happen in... So there’s many different ways where they do this. And one of them, like you said, is maritime, under international waters. And the flags that they use on the ships are from other countries. So it’s not necessarily immediately clear that, oh, this ship is linked to North Korea. They also change the name of the ships very frequently. So a ship may have one name today and in three months, it’ll have a totally different name under a different flag. So that makes it difficult to accurately, it usually takes months later when analysts go over these satellite images, and then put them together with measurements, and then they can see that, oh, it was the same ship. But to catch it in real time is very difficult. I think the sanctions evasions have definitely gone up since 2022, because ever since, I think it was a big deal in 2022 when both China and Russia didn’t vote in favor of more sanctions against North Korea. And since then, it’s just all gone downhill from there, the enforcement of sanctions, especially by Russia, obviously. And China also has been very vocal about not supporting sanctions anymore, that sanctions aren’t going to work and that sanctions are not the way. I think if other smaller countries, especially in Africa, other countries that may otherwise have been willing to trade with North Korea, at least in a limited way, if they see two of the biggest powers in the world openly defy U.S. and U.N. sanctions, I think that makes them more willing to follow suit. If we look at the list of countries that have the top 10 trading partners of North Korea for last year, according to the South Korean Central Bank’s research, you have countries in there like Laos, like Tanzania—Tanzania was like number three. It’s very interesting because we never hear about that. We don’t know anything about this kind of trade, because, of course, these countries, if you look at the U.N. reports about sanctions enforcement, they don’t provide—Obviously, they’re not going to provide a list of things that they traded with North Korea, or notify the UN about these things. So it’s very interesting to see that, yeah, North Korea does have other trading partners besides Russia and China, and a lot of the trade is in minerals and things like that. But its options could grow, because its diplomatic partnerships are also expanding and growing. For example, with Belarus, they made many deals with Belarus this year and last year. Relations with Vietnam are also very strong. And because a lot of these countries are already not democracies, it’s more difficult for us to know what happens after they sign these deals. So we don’t know. A lot of trade could be going on and probably is going on behind the scenes with many of these diplomatic partners of North Korea. We just don’t know. We’re just not that aware of it. Jersey Lee It seems that Kim Jong-un has made it increasingly obvious his daughter is going to succeed him as Supreme Leader. Given that he also has a younger son [Correction: should be older son], why is he choosing a female successor, which seems like it might ruffle some feathers in a society like North Korea’s? How do they think of the prospect of a future female supreme leader? And more broadly—you mentioned this a few times—can this de facto monarchy continue for the foreseeable future? Or other than what we’ve already discussed, is there potential for regime instability? Gabriela Bernal Both are possible. But first of all, about the son, we do not know for sure that he has a son because there have been a lot of high-level sources in South Korea and North Korean defectors as well that have said, no, Kim Jong-un does not have a son, that his oldest child is Ju-ae, this is this girl, the daughter. So we do not know for sure, but there have been a lot of authoritative people who have said that there is no son. So that’s one thing we don’t know. If he does have a son, it could all be a ruse just to take the focus away and to confuse and all that. But for now, we don’t know if a son even exists. That’s the first thing. And two, why a woman? Well, again, I think Kim Jong-un has, unlike his predecessors, he has been actually much more open to women in high level positions. If we look at the foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, if we look at his—even the role for his wife has been, compared to other first ladies, the role of his wife and of course his sister, who has been like the face of North Korean media for years now, he has shown himself much more open and I guess—I don’t know if open-minded is the right word, but at least willing to use women. His daughter, well, first of all, if he doesn’t have a son, then he doesn’t have a choice, right? If he doesn’t have a son, he has no choice but to choose his daughter then, the oldest one. And second, even if he does have a son, I think the important thing is, which he learned through his father—because Kim Jong-un was not supposed to be the first choice for successor. His elder brother was supposed to be the choice, but Kim Jong-il did not choose the other one because the other one would have been—he had zero leadership qualities whatsoever, he would go to Disneyland and Tokyo and concerts, and he had no—for lack of better description, that “dictatorial aura” was not there, you know? So I don’t think he’s going to choose. Kim Jong-un knows that, because that’s why he was chosen, because his father saw him, even though he was younger, he saw him as a much better potential leader than his elder brother. And you know that ultimately what matters is the survival of the regime. And so if choosing the younger son or if choosing a daughter who is strong-willed and a potentially very strong leader, if that is what’s going to enhance the chances of regime survival, I think that is the decision that the leader will make. Regardless of whether it’s a daughter or a son or the eldest or the youngest. So I think that’s one thing that Kim Jong-un must have taken from his own experience with the succession. Also, like you said, won’t it ruffle some feathers? Of course it will, because North Korea is a very patriarchal society. It’s still very male dominated, definitely. And there are high level North Korean escapees who say that, no, North Korean people would never accept a female leader. Yeah, possibly not yet. But I think that Kim Jong-un knows this. And possibly, if she is his top choice for successor, then it makes sense why he would bring her out from such a young age, because there’s really no [other] reason for him to, because he can show her off at a major event, at a family kind of thing, that he’s there with his wife and his children, to portray this image of normalcy, which is another reason why people say he brought his daughter out, is to show himself in a more normal light. But I don’t necessarily agree with that, because then it would be enough to just show her occasionally in a more familial setting. Even with photos maybe taken at home or taken at a beach or whatever, something more family like. But the fact that he takes her out to like missile tests and he took her to China last year, the way that he brings her to these very specific, important military security related political events, that doesn’t add to that argument that, oh, he wants to seem like a normal person, a normal leader. No. Why would he do that? And it’s the image that he’s creating for her, because again, North Korea is very, very centered around propaganda, around idolization of the leaders and all this. It would make perfect sense for him to use this strategy of showing his daughter in public to the country and to the world from such a young age. So then by the time, let’s say she takes over power in 10 years or whatever it is, or eight years, or at least whether she’s named successor when she reaches of age, that it would be maybe more palatable for the North Korean public, because that’s what really matters, because the world will have to deal with whoever is chosen, so that’s not so much of the problem. The problem is the North Korean people, will they accept her leadership or not? And there’s a much higher chance of them accepting her leadership if she’s been in the public eye, if she’s been among military generals and in that circle for by then maybe 10 years or more than 10 years. So in that sense, I think the strategy would make a lot of sense, but whether that is his intention, we won’t know for a while. But for now, she does seem like the most plausible successor. Jersey Lee By “people”, you’re referring to North Korean elite, presumably not ordinary North Koreans, or do they get a say? Gabriela Bernal Both. I think because the society—especially the elite, for sure, the elite would be even more difficult. Because they actually have the power. There are military generals that could potentially plot a coup or something. And especially if Kim Jong-un would die, that would be especially possible. So I think that is definitely something that is a threat, and that he knows. Because as long as Kim Jong-un is alive, all the elite have to, even if they don’t agree with it, and even if they can’t possibly imagine this little girl being the leader in the future, they have to go with it because that’s what the leader is deciding now. But if he was not to be there anymore, I think that would be very difficult to get the elites on board in the in the short term, which is why a lot of analysts also, including myself, argue that if Kim Jong Un would die prematurely or like within the next 10 years, It would make much more sense for his sister to take over, at least for a few years, until the daughter gains more experience and until her position is more secure. So, yeah, it’s a risky thing. Jersey Lee Well, Kim Yo-jong, I feel like if I was Kim Yo-jong and it’s like, okay, we’re already setting a precedent that it’s okay to have a female supreme leader, why can’t it be me? Gabriela Bernal Yeah, exactly. Yeah, definitely. I think that is another open question, would she not plot something? That’s a very good question. We don’t know. Again, I think as long as her brother is alive, as long as he is alive, it’s very difficult for anyone to really openly defy him and reject his decision. So if Kim Jong-un is still alive and he officially names his daughter as his successor, it would be much more difficult for anyone to really openly challenge that, including his sister. But like you said, if he doesn’t name her officially his successor and he suddenly dies, it would make more sense for her to be leader. And then would she step away after a few years to then make way for the daughter of her brother, her niece to take over power, or would she stick to power? Would she just, I don’t know, exile the niece potentially or something. It’s all possible. It’s like a Game of Thrones kind of thing. It could, yeah, it’s possible. Jersey Lee Finally, you’re originally from the Caribbean island of Curacao. What got you interested in North Korea, which is almost diametrically on the other end of the world? Also, I imagine it’s quite difficult for you to even step foot in North Korea. So how do you even study it? Gabriela Bernal Very long story, but I’ll keep it very short. I became interested in the history of Korea after visiting here, after visiting the Korean War Memorial in 2017, that’s when I really learned more in detail about the Korean War and especially the division of the country, I thought was very unique and interesting from the perspective of someone who was studying political science at the time. I thought it was a unique case compared to the other countries that I was studying, because the fact that the war had not ended yet, the fact that North and South Korea are now like separate countries, but still want unification, and North Korea being this enigma, such a mysterious place with such little information, everything was very unique about this situation, about the Korean Peninsula. Initially I was just intrigued by it. And I started reading more about Korean history and North Korea. And I wasn’t planning on going so deep into it. But then the pandemic in 2020 happened and I had other plans, but of course, that didn’t work out. And a professor of mine referred me to this Ph.D. program that the Ministry of Unification was hosting for the first time ever, for North Korean studies, because they wanted more foreigners to become experts on North Korea. And I thought there was nothing else I could do at the time, because all the borders were closed in many countries and all the programs were canceled. But this was open. This was July 2020, right at the start of the pandemic. And so I decided to come here to South Korea then to do the PhD because I thought, one, it’s a very unique opportunity to learn under such a—because the University of North Korean Studies is only, like the name suggests, is only about North Korea and all the professors are experts in a specific field related to North Korea. The whole thing was in Korean. That’s also really helpful, of course. And I genuinely didn’t have anything else to do. So I thought I would do it. And it was only three years compared to other PhDs, which take many, many years. This program was specifically three years. So, yeah, I thought, why not? And that’s how I kind of by accident became more specialized in North Korea. That was not my intention initially, but it’s a very unique—I don’t only focus on North Korea, I focus on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian diplomacy and security in general. North Korea is an extremely unique place to study for sure. Very difficult, very challenging. But yeah, I think at the time also when I as a student, I was thinking, there’s a lot of China experts, there’s so many China experts. There’s quite a lot of Japan experts as well. But Korea, there were not a lot of people back then, and even now today, but especially back then, there were not so many people focused on the Korean Peninsula specifically. So I thought it would be a good niche as well to differentiate myself from like other political analysts. And I truly do love it here. Jersey Lee That’s such a unique experience. It was so great to have you on. Gabriela Bernal Thank you for having me. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com (https://pacificpolarity.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1)

2. 

   27 Aug 2026

   Tom Wright: Living with Two Americas

   Tom Wright joins Pacific Polarity to discuss the emergence of "two Americas", the consequences of America's political volatility for its allies, and what a future US strategy towards China might look like. Wright argues that allies cannot simply wait for the next administration to restore the old order, but need alliances that are structurally resilient to changes in Washington. He also argues that Trump is less interested in strategic competition with China than his predecessors, while defending the Biden administration's approach as responsible competition rather than a new Cold War. Using rare earths as a case study, he discusses America's difficulty in responding to China's economic leverage, the need for greater strategic industrial policy, and working with allies at an "allied scale". He also shares his thoughts on Trump's transactional approach to alliances, his meetings with Xi Jinping, and the emerging debate over the future of Democratic foreign policy. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com (https://pacificpolarity.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1)

3. 

   8 Aug 2026

   Dave Sharma: Securing Australia’s National Interest in the Indo-Pacific

   On the latest episode of Pacific Polarity, Jersey Lee spoke with Australian Senator Dave Sharma about Australia's role in the Indo-Pacific, its relationships with the United States and China, and the Coalition's approach to international development and climate policy. Sharma argues that Australia should support continued American engagement in global conflicts rather than begrudge Washington's attention beyond the Indo-Pacific, while using its own development assistance more strategically in the region. He discusses the challenge of speaking clearly about China while avoiding unfair treatment of Australians of Chinese heritage, and advocates a nuanced approach that combines partnership and trade with firm resistance to actions that threaten Australia's security. Sharma also argues that China's military buildup is the primary driver of regional tensions, while noting that both major Australian parties broadly share a pragmatic approach to the Indo-Pacific. He also shared his views on the Coalition's climate policy, especially as it relates to Pacific Island nations This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com (https://pacificpolarity.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1)

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• Kurt Tong
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