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Decisive Point Podcast

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Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

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Episode thumbnail for Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-1 – Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl – Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23

June 23, 2026

Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-1 – Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl – Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23

The fundamentals the Irish National Army used in the Irish Civil War (1922–23) are a model for the successful application of a classic counterinsurgency which, if understood earlier, could have made a difference in the United States’ most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. John A. Nagl and Gareth Prendergast explain. Keywords: counterinsurgency, Ireland, Irish Civil War, military strategy, treatyStephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to <a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134);">Decisive Point</a>. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I am speaking with Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl today.Prendergast is a serving colonel in the Irish Army and the author of Clear-Hold-Build: How the Free State Won the Irish Civil WarNagl is the General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. They coauthored “Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23,” which you can find in the Summer 2026 issue of Parameters.This podcast has been a long time in the making. Thank you both for showing up today.John A. NaglDelighted to be here, Stephanie.Gareth PrendergastHello, Stephanie.HostLet’s just start at the beginning. How did you two meet?Prendergast I met John at a conference in, Ireland, well, 15 years ago. And, I’d heard all about him. I’d read his book. I bought him a pint of Guinness, and we were chatting at the bar for the evening in the officer’s mess. I felt we obviously made a connection. So, a few years later, when I asked him if he’d like to write the foreword to my book, he was very generous, and he said he would—but I had to invite him to Ireland and buy him a pint of Guinness.So, I did that.NaglThat seemed reasonable to me. It seemed like a reasonable ask on my part.PrendergastYeah.So, I met him in Ireland, and he says, “Oh, you’re not the guy I remember. You’re a different person.” So…But he still came all the way over to Ireland, and he still wrote the foreword to my book. And, I hope we’ve become good friends ever since.And, I would like to thank him.Nagl Yeah, Gareth and I have spent time together, both, on his island and, here in the United States. And, I was really honored to write the foreword to his book, which is another example of the basic principles of counterinsurgency being applied to a case that many people on this side of the Atlantic don’t know very well.And, it illustrates, to me, the enduring value of the counterinsurgency doctrine that General David Petraeus, General Jim Mattis, [Dr.] Conrad [C.] Crane of our own Army War College, [and] a number of people wrote, now 20 years ago.And, that continues to, I think, influence how—not just the American military, but a number of militaries around the world—think about this very challenging kind of war.Host Why did you decide to write this article?Prendergast It’s primarily from my book. And, I just wanted to highlight to people in America (and to a newer audience) the dangers, first of all, of a civil war and how you can blindly follow an ideology, or your leadership, as it happened in the Irish Civil War, into a vicious encounter—even though you don’t fully understand what you’re fighting for.And, I also wanted to demonstrate how the clear-hold-build philosophy that was developed by the Americans during the Iraq conflict actually worked during the Irish Civil War. And, I thought the Irish Civil War, as John said earlier, would be a very good case study to study clear, hold, build.And, when John offered to write an article with me, I [said], “Yeah, this would be fantastic to do it in such a prestigious magazine as Parameters.”And it’s just a pleasure to be able to write an article with John Nagl.Host Well, we’re delighted to have both of you in Parameters.Nagl We are happy to be in Parameters.Gareth is being modest, I think, which is a bit of the Irish one. First, his brother is a student here at the Army War College this year—his taller and better-looking brother. I think he’s the smart one, and his brother, John, is the good-looking one.His book has done remarkably well in Ireland, and I think deserves more attention here on this side of the pond.PrendergastThanks very much, John, for [those] kind words.Nagl And, just a reminder that Ireland and America have both suffered from horrible civil wars. And, I think we have a great deal to learn from each other—from each other’s experiences and, the effort [required] to make sure that those sorts of horrors never happen again here, or in other countries, to the extent that we can.Host A few minutes ago, Gareth, you alluded to the similarities between the Irish Civil War and conflicts in the twenty-first century. What makes this conflict, in your view, so relevant to the challenges faced by armies in the twenty-first century, particularly in places, as you mentioned, like Iraq and Afghanistan?Prendergast I think one of the key elements of it is why the antitreaty IRA (Irish Republican Army) started the civil war over an ideology. John and I are both graduates of the US Army Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, [Kansas], (and actually, John is a Marshall Award-winning graduate). But, one of the first things we learn over there is the Clausewitzian quote that no one starts a war, or rather, no one in his sense, ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it.I think that’s as true today, especially if we look at what’s happening in Iran, as what happened during the Irish Civil War. We see the protagonists, the antitreaty IRA side, try to win it militarily with no real political or strategic end state. They [believed] that just by killing more of the opposite sides, they would they would win the war.As the war progressed, they weren’t offering an alternative [to the] the people, a strategic end state, a political matter. It just shows to me that you can’t win a war militarily. COA (course of action) counts for insurgency is only 20 percent military. It’s 80 percent everything else.And, the Free State, or the pro-treaty side, realize that, and they competed for the popular will of the population by restoring essential services, the economy, governance, and providing an ulterior end state of a free state that’s not yet a republic, but it’s a stepping stone to a republic.And eventually, they won the popular narrative with the population, alienating and isolating the antitreaty IRA side. Host A key pillar of the Irish Free State success was the use of locally recruited soldiers and police who lived among the population, which contrasts with modern approaches that rely largely on isolated forward operating bases. What are the key advantages of this embedded local-first approach, and why do you think it is so difficult for modern military forces to replicate?Prendergast I agree with that 100 percent because when I was a young officer in Lebanon, back in the early 1990s, we lived in the towns and villages. We had our platoon bases inherent and embedded with the local population. We would have our meetings with the mayors and the mukhtars on a weekly, if not daily, basis.Now, that was dangerous, but it still afforded us a common bond with the people we were there to protect, and you can’t just commute to work, as they say in counterinsurgency. But, as it got more dangerous, the Irish and other UN nations retreated into bigger bases, and I think the same happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, during the conflict. John can correct me if I’m wrong.It was only during the surge that they later came back out and started to push into the population areas. And, I’m saying that the Free State, the national army during the Irish Civil War, realized this, and they realized that they had to spread out into the Irish countryside. And in total, they set up nearly 380 bases throughout Ireland with an army that rose to the size of 60,000 soldiers.And, even in the county of Cork, where I concentrate my studies, they set up 64 different platoon-size bases, so as to provide the security, to get the general information, and to basically win the confidence of the population. And, the British Army could never achieve that in the previous war of independence against the IRA. They say the young British soldier in the bases had as much strategic awareness as a soldier in Nepal as he has of Cork.So, I think the lessons from the Irish Civil War are very prevalent today [regarding] what happened in Iraq, what happened in Afghanistan, and what might happen in the future. So,there’s a lot of learnings from that.Nagl I think that’s exactly right. And, I think there’s a question of risk. In order to succeed in these kind of wars, you have to be willing to accept risk for your soldiers in order to keep the population safer, and it is only if your soldiers are taking that risk in support of the population that the population will trust you with the information you need to reduce the insurgents and win the war. So, there’s a trust basis that has to be formed between the population and the people conducting the counterinsurgency, and it took a long time to develop that. And, some hard lessons had to be relearned, in...

June 12, 2026

Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-10 – Henry Sokolski – “A Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants”

In this episode, Henry Sokolski discusses how proportionality can serve as a concrete tool for winning wars and maintaining alliances and defines the roles the Lieber Code, the Geneva Conventions, precision weapons, and public narratives play in warfare.Keywords: proportionality, civilian infrastructure, nuclear targeting, military strategy, international lawStephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to <a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134);">Decisive Point</a>. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.Henry Sokolski is joining me remotely today. Sokolski is the author of “A Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. He is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has worked in the Pentagon as the deputy for nonproliferation policy, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, as a member of the CIA's Senior Advisory Group, and as a senate military and legislative aide. He is also the author and editor of numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation issues. Welcome back, Henry.Henry Sokolski [It is] good to be back. Thank you for having me.HostIn your article, you argue that proportionality should not just be viewed as an abstract legal or moral constraint but as a concrete tool for winning wars. How does a commander distinguish between a strike that is legally permissible under the Lieber Code—which focuses on military necessity and protecting civilians, among other things—but is strategically self-defeating in the long run?Sokolski Well, first of all, who is Mr. [Francis] Lieber? Well, he advised President [Abraham] Lincoln, and he wanted to have a code that was more civilized than the European military codes—particularly on the question of, you guessed it, slavery. But along the way, he wanted to make sure that other things were attended to, like the unnecessary harassment and abuse of civilians and the things critical to civilian life.The Lieber Code basically became international law later. So, this guy is very important to understanding the law of war. Now, in there, he made this effort to protect civilians and civilian objects. However, he knew that commanders would do what they would do, and he gave them a get out of jail card, if you will, a free pass. Well, if they think it’s militarily essential to hit something that might cause a lot of harm to civilians or the objects they need to survive, it’s okay. It becomes extremely subjective.So, I don’t think there’s any problem for someone to do something legal under the Lieber Code. They’re given wide swath, as long as they can claim (or insist) that they had to do it. However, the distinction would be not so much between the Lieber Code and what makes sense but, rather, simply trying to understand what victory requires in the way of military operation.In this case, I think most military experienced hands can tell the difference between achieving the objective by avoiding aggravating the locals, if you will—by killing innocents unnecessarily and destroying civil objects that are not critical to winning the military objective—or achieving it and not. And, those military hands can actually see someone misbehaving and discipline them and say, “Stop doing that.”I think that it’s much more along those lines than some kind of legal determination. So, for example, if you destroy a dam or you spew radioactivity on the field that you have to march over, you’re marching slower, it gets in the way of what you need to do. And of course, it harms the civilians that are, you know, underneath the water or exposed to radiation.If you want to repatriate quickly and restore services, destroying something would make far less sense than temporarily disabling it. If you want lines of communication to be wide open, you don’t want to annoy and anger the locals so much that they become active enemies. All of these points were understood by generals as far across the spectrum from [German Field Marshal Erwin] Rommel, who [served the Nazis], to [General Dwight D.] Eisenhower. And so, it’s not as though this isn’t available historically to any sound commander who’s doing his studies properly.How shall I put it? This may be art, but you can tell what art is and [it] isn’t as subjective as the Lieber Code, which says, “Well, whatever it is, if you claim it was necessary, you’ve got legal cover.”This is not a legal concept. This is a military operational concept. And, I think leadership is found in generals who command those beneath them to pay attention to being efficient and achieving their military goals, and that requires a due respect and due regard to sensible proportionality.HostYou also mentioned that modern precision weapons allow for disabling nuclear plants without releasing radiation. Does the existence of this technology make civilian infrastructure more likely to be targeted? And if it does, does that create a more dangerous, permissive environment for military planners?SokolskiYou’re going to be firing at more things when you have precision, precisely because you can disable without physically obliterating the target. Now, when you get sloppy (or you get impatient and you run out of your precision munitions and just start lobbing things to flatten the entire facility), that’s no longer precise. It can’t be said that, “Well, the precision led to non-precision and, therefore, you shouldn’t try to be precise.”I mean it’s a little bit too much, but there is a problem, and that is—in “new generation warfare,” coined by our Russian friends that we are backing into understanding we’re going to have to wage—you’re going to be firing more munitions at more objects, civilian objects, in the future. And, it’s all the more reason to pay closer attention to the dividing line between precision strikes that disable temporarily—or, you know, maybe disable permanently—and things that physically obliterate and release hazardous forces. You want to draw that line, and you want to discipline anybody who goes over it because once you get into the habit of being reckless and indiscriminate, you lose the good order and discipline of the troops. And when you lose that, you lose. No matter what your weapons are or how good your plans are, you will not prevail. Host Your article highlights a friction point where 174 nations have ratified Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, but the United States has not. What does Protocol I say, and how does this legal discrepancy jeopardize military cohesion and joint operations during an active conflict with a peer adversary like Russia?SokolskiWe had a game in which Russia starts taking potshots at NATO reactors, not just Ukrainian ones. And at some point, there’s a mild release of radiation because they cause a loss-of-coolant accident and some radiation is vented. And, there’s quite a lot of confusion in the game as to how much radiation [is leaked] and what the effects are. And, let’s just say the fog of war doesn’t get any better when you hit one of these things, and it starts releasing some radiation. Panic ensues, [among] the locals. Whereas the United States says, “Well, you know, we signed this thing, but we didn’t ratify it. You folks in NATO ratified it. And, of course, you’re closer to the radiation. So, your interpretation of what we ought to do about this, whether it’s a clear violation of international law, and whether we should respond by firing in kind or doing something, quote unquote proportionate against the Russians, we have a different view than you.”Well, how does that work? Well, you spend a lot of time debating about what to do, and the operations get paused or hung up, [while you] figure out what to do next. You want the momentum of campaign, if you will, not be interrupted by legal debates or moral debates or debates about how you feel or how comfortable you are with the radiation levels that are confusing. So, it would be better if we were reading from a similar sheet. That would be the point. And, I think that Protocol I doesn’t prohibit hitting reactors, but it has a presumption against doing so.I think that presumption against doing so is not quite as clear in the [US Law of War Manual], which says, “[We’d], like to [follow this presumption] but, of course, you’re free if you have to, to go ahead and possibly hit one of these things and release dangerous forces—if it’s necessary.”Going back to the Lieber Code, that’s a little too sophisticated for clarity. You know, in military affairs, much as in politics, a certain amount of, I wouldn’t say simplicity, but clarity, is required for success. [America’s legal position on proportionality] is lawyer sophisticated, if you will, and I think it’s not helped.HostOne of your primary recommendations is for the Pentagon to share more public narratives regarding infrastructure protection. How do you answer critics who argue that making these tear sheets public would provide a roadmap for adversaries to more effectively sabotage US utilities?Sokolski Well, first, let’s understand what a tear sheet is. A tear sheet isn’t to get everything that’s classified out in the public. It’s where you tear the sheet between truly sensitive information and information that you can share with the public, and you ought to. We have used secrecy to try to solve the problem—and it’s an increasing one—of the vulnerability of critical civilian objects an...

Episode thumbnail for Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-9 – Tim Devine and Jonathan Gerson – on “Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Period (1919–41)”

May 27, 2026

Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-9 – Tim Devine and Jonathan Gerson – on “Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Period (1919–41)”

In this episode, Tim Devine and Jon Gerson argue that the US Army must restore the primacy of mobilization planning to prepare for the growing likelihood of a protracted large-scale war involving the United States. While the Army’s transformation initiatives have emphasized important tactical matters, Devine and Gerson call attention to critical strategic vulnerabilities associated with mobilization—one of the Army’s enduring core functions. They offer insights, identify challenges, and offer recommendations for contemporary leaders and practitioners by analyzing the body of thought on mobilization planning during the interwar period (1919–41) and drawing connections to the present day.Keywords: mobilization, strategic planning, large-scale war, readiness, Interwar PeriodStephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to <a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134);">Decisive Point</a>. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Today we’re discussing national mobilization.While the United States military pivoted to an era of great-power competition years ago, the strategic environment continues to evolve. Joining us remotely today is Lieutenant Colonel Tim Devine, an active-duty Army strategist, author of “Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Years, 1919–41,” which was published in the Summer 2025 issue of Parameters. He has strategic planning experience on the Army Staff and in the Indo-Pacific and is currently an instructor at the Army’s Command and General Staff College.Tim, welcome.Tim DevineThanks, Stephanie. It’s a pleasure to be here.HostWe’re also joined by Colonel John Gerson, a Title 10 National Guard officer and senior planner at the National Guard Bureau. He brings experience from several key assignments in the Joint Staff, the Army War Plans Division, the office of the Secretary of Defense (now Secretary of War), and the Guard Bureau.John, thanks for joining us.Jonathan GersonThanks, Stephanie. Thanks for inviting me on. It’s always great to share the mic with Tim.HostTim, your article is the foundation for our conversation today. In it, you argue the Army must restore the primacy of mobilization planning. To start, could you summarize why you believe looking back 100 years to the interwar period is so crucial for the challenges the Army faces right now?DevineAbsolutely. And first, I’ll emphasize that I’m a practitioner. I’m not a professional historian, but I was struck just by how much of this history is relevant for our contemporary time. Right after World War I, it was really the last time that the Army had to build a mass mobilization model almost from scratch. And World War I mobilization was chaotic and, although it was ultimately successful, there was a long list of shortcomings that illuminated the need for systematic reform.And, this experience had a profound effect on those who took part, particularly those in the Army who later held prominent roles throughout the interwar years—so, Chiefs of Staff like [General] John [J.] Pershing, General [Douglas] MacArthur, [General Malin] Craig and, of course, General George [C.] Marshall. And, each of them advanced proficiency in strategic planning in their own way.Now, fast forward to today, and there’s a lot that we can apply from this period. And, even during my time in uniform, which is approaching the 20-year mark, I’ve lived through the Army’s shift from the two decades of counterinsurgency to renew the focus on large-scale combat—or LSCO, as we call it. And given this shift institutionally, it’s clear that the Army is wrestling with how to prepare its forces for the growing likelihood of these potentialities.This impacts everything—how the Army organizes itself, how we train our forces, how we equip them, how we measure readiness, and how we view and anticipate the character of war changing. There’s a lot of credible sources out there that have expressed the fact that there is a growing chance for large-scale conflict involving the United States. And, I know that’s a sobering aspect of the conversation today, but that reality emplaces an important demand signal on the Army. And, that demand signal is not only to fight the nation’s wars—fight and win the nation’s wars, rather—but to generate the force needed to do so. And, of course, these two things go hand in hand, but today’s discussion will focus on the latter.And, I want to stress, too, that the force I’m talking about—the war-winning force—in all likelihood, far exceeds what we have today. And I’m not just talking about the active component. This includes the reserve component, which consists of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. So, in other words, there must be a plan for generating the right mix beyond the force in being, and that could be difficult to imagine. So, the interwar period offers us a blueprint, not for perfect solutions, but of the intellectual journey needed to prepare.HostYou mentioned the Army developed a planning ecosystem to tackle this challenge. What did that look like?DevineOverall, it was a network of institutions and processes that was really meant to build intellectual capital. And, through this ecosystem, the Army learned to speak the language of national mobilization. And, to me, that’s really the biggest takeaway that I gained from studying this period. And, during my research, a colleague of mine recommended I read Henry [G.] Gole’s book titled The Road to Rainbow.And, I’m sure that title is familiar to many of your listeners, but for those that are not familiar with this, Rainbow, of course, refers to the famous Rainbow Series plans. These replace the so-called Color Plans that were, as one Army historian put it, “little more than abstract academic exercises.” But, to get us to an integrated set of plans, Gole explores this ecosystem—the planning ecosystem—created by the Army, which consisted of four pillars.First was professional military education. The second was practicums—think like war games and exercises and so forth. The third was studies, and the fourth was continuous planning. There’s really a lot I could go into about Gole’s work, but just given that we’re constrained on time here, I’ll focus my comments about the cumulative effect of it all—so, the formal education, follow-on assignments to the War Plans Division, [of] which Colonel Gerson and I are proud alumni, constantly writing and rewriting these plans.All of that proved invaluable. And, while the plans themselves were riddled with flaws, especially the early plans during the 1920s, it was the process, really, that revealed not only the problems’ immense complexities but also the extraordinary scope. So consequently, over time, the plans got better and, eventually, they linked force-generation requirements to operations envisioned by the regional war plans. They drew connections between the two chief commodities, which I like that term. It’s one I borrowed from the readings that I found during my study—the two chief commodities, the mobilization, manpower, and materiel. And, the assumptions became more realistic. The calculations got better. So, when war finally came, this intellectual capital gain from these integrated planning frameworks was arguably the most valuable strategic asset that the Army had.HostYour article highlights significant disconnects during that period between manpower and materiel plans and between defensive assumptions and offensive war plans. Do you see similar gaps today?DevineI do, and I touched on this briefly, so I’m glad you’re giving me a chance to unpack the idea further. For me, during my study of the interwar years, it illuminated how important those connections are. And, I’m talking about the connections between the interrelated parts of an immensely complex system that we call national mobilization. So obviously, many of these parts, like supply chains, for instance, transcend the Army, but they’re all related.[The] first point I’d like to make is [that we should] consider these two basic commodities that I mentioned earlier, manpower and materiel. And, the World War I mobilization experience was really a failure to synchronize the two. I mentioned it was a success in the long run, but this is one of the big points that came out of it. And I really like the quote from Arthur Herman, who’s the author of Freedom’s Forge, to illustrate this point.And that’s another title many of your readers are probably familiar with. So, Herman writes “[Of] the 10,000 75mm artillery pieces the War Department ordered, only 143 ever reached the front—and not one American-made tank.”So, interestingly, the disconnect between manpower and materiel planning remained prevalent throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. And, it’s easy to see the flaw here, but I assure you that planning stovepipes are still alive and well. The second point [is] throughout most of the interwar period, there was a huge disconnect between the concepts guiding the mobilization plans and those for the regional war plans. So, the mobilization plans were based on defensive concepts like hemispheric defense, whereas the regional war plans like War Plan Orange were offensive.So, in other words, if the Army had to fight War Plan Orange, there was not a corresponding mobilization plan to generate the force needed to do so. And those that know their history here, the Army of the interwar years was a Spartan-sized, poorly equipped force that really couldn’t handle any contingency scenario, let alone any...

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What is Decisive Point Podcast?: Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil
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