Navigating the Vortex

About Navigating the Vortex

Rigorous analysis of the forces shaping our world — Geopolitics & International Affairs, Markets & Economics, Corporate Governance & Stewardship, Leadership, Strategy & Power, Technology & AI, and ESG & Sustainability. Lucy Marcus and Stefan Wolff bring decades of boardroom, diplomatic, and academic experience to bear on the questions that matter most. www.navigatingthevortex.com (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com?utm_medium=podcast)

Publisher

Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff

Category

business · news

Language

en

Explicit

No

First episode

5 Apr 2023

Latest episode

5 Mar 2026

Latest episodes

88 episodes in the feed.

1. 

   5 Mar 2026

   What the war against Iran means for Putin and Ukraine

   As the war in the Middle East spreads and intensifies (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-us-israel-war-iran-not-going-take-years-2026-03-03/), the one in Ukraine continues (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-makes-gains-southeast-region-zaporizhzhia-kyiv-says-2026-03-02/). While geographically some 2,500 km (1,600 miles) apart, the impact of US president Donald Trump’s latest military adventure on the Russian war against Ukraine will be acutely felt across several areas. In the short term, the Kremlin will probably feel emboldened to double down on its aggression, but this is unlikely to shift the dial significantly towards Russian victory in the long term. The targeted killing (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/inside-the-us-israel-plan-to-assassinate-irans-khamenei) of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by a precision US strike will likely have reminded the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of his reportedly “apoplectic” reaction (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/libya-russia-ukraine-putin/626571/) to the killing of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Comments on social media from the likes of far-right nationalist Alexander Dugin, who posted (https://t.me/Agdchan/25195), that “one by one, our allies are being systematically destroyed”, and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who alleged (https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/134) that the “talks with Iran were just a cover”, are unlikely to have steadied Putin’s nerves. The Russian leader’s fears about being next after a string of US successes (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/02/us/politics/maduro-khamenei-trump-surveillance.html) targeting foreign leaders may have been played up somewhat by the western media (https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/22799961/putin-biggest-fear-killed-gaddafi-coming-true-wagner/), but they are not completely unfounded. Putin continues to walk a fine line between paranoia (https://www.politico.eu/article/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-killing-vladimir-putin-russia-iran/) and his outrage over the killing of Khamenei, which he condemned (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/letters/79237) in a condolence letter to the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law”. But he did not mention Trump or the US as the culprits. Concerns about his own longevity, however, will not be the only things weighing on Putin’s mind and compelling him to double down on his war against Ukraine. The escalation of violence in the Middle East also offers Russia several opportunities in its war of aggression against Ukraine — at least in the short term. The sharp rise in oil prices throws Moscow a new lifeline for financing its ongoing war. Not only did prices spike (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cr5lz0vgy52o) — with Brent crude oil hitting (https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/brent-crude-oil) $85 per barrel for the first time in almost two years — but the sudden, and likely lasting, inability of Iran to export oil will also have a major impact on China (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-heavy-reliance-iranian-oil-imports-2026-01-13/), which bought over 80% of all Iranian maritime oil exports, equivalent to some 13% of Chinese maritime oil imports. China has large stockpiles (https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-imports-most-energy-is-best-placed-iran-2026-03-03/) of oil which will allow it to ride out current inflation. But Beijing is now likely to double down (https://www.ft.com/content/114997aa-7d7c-4d85-b696-bc5123ade6cb) on its energy relationship with Russia. This will serve both countries well: Russia will deepen its economic ties with China and rebalance the relationship, while China will tap into a reliable supply line that will not be as vulnerable to being choked off as maritime supply routes in a future confrontation with the US. The closure (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-strait-of-hormuz-closed-oil-shipments-suspended-us-attack-b2929506.html) of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian strikes (https://www.dw.com/en/iran-attacks-on-gulf-oil-and-gas-sites-trigger-energy-fears/a-76199281) against oil and gas facilities across the Gulf countries have destabilised global energy markets. With some 30% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of all trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade affected (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/01/experts-weigh-potential-scenarios-for-oil-if-strait-of-hormuz-closes.html), this represents a market opportunity for Russia and its shadow fleet of tankers, at least in the short term, given that Moscow retains (https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/09/ukraine-russia-strikes-oil-refineries-economy-gas-crisis/) sufficient refining and port capacity — despite a long Ukrainian air campaign (https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/ukraine-strikes-russian-oil-pipeline-hungary-slovakia/) against the country’s oil infrastructure. Another likely benefit the Kremlin will reap are problems with weapons supplies to Ukraine. While insisting that the US had “virtually unlimited supply” of weapons and munitions, Trump (https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116163464520215003) also conceded that there were areas “at the highest end, (where) we have a good supply, but are not where we want to be”. This is a view echoed within the Pentagon where officials are keen to discuss (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/defense-executives-plan-meet-white-house-strikes-iran-diminish-stockpiles-2026-03-04/) an acceleration of weapons production with key arms manufacturers. With large parts of western military support for Ukraine consisting of US weapons paid for by Kyiv’s European allies via NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative (https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/12/10/nato-allies-and-partners-fund-over-4-billion-in-purl-packages-for-ukraine), shortages on the US side will immediately impact the flow of vital equipment to Ukraine. Even deliveries already agreed could be derailed. In June 2025, during the so-called 12-day war with Iran, the US diverted (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/08/7516207/) some 20,000 missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East. Russia is unlikely to face any similar constraints. On the contrary: a Russian-Iranian deal in late 2022 enabled (https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl) Moscow to acquire technology from Tehran that allowed the Kremlin to kick-start domestic drone production based on the Iranian Shahed design. Not only has Russia improved (https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/08/10/shaheds-for-what-russia-drone-deal-may-have-given-iran-sellers-remorse/) the drones, it now also produces them faster and cheaper than Iran ever did. If western military supplies to Ukraine now dry up even temporarily as a result of an increased focus of the US on the Middle East, Russia’s air superiority and the devastating impact its relentless campaign of missile and drone strikes has had on Ukraine is likely to continue unabated for now. At the same time, however, this drives home the point that dependence on the US puts Ukraine and its European allies in an unacceptably precarious position. Ukraine’s own defence industry already meets (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/02/19/8021822/) half of the country’s needs, and the fallout from Iran war will likely further accelerate homegrown military production and innovation across Europe as the traditional US-European alliance frays. In the short term, however, this ongoing transatlantic decoupling will serve Moscow’s interests more than Kyiv’s. European countries, including the UK (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy4wgpdllleo), France (https://www.politico.eu/article/us-strikes-on-iran-outside-international-law/), and Spain (https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-pedro-sanchez-emerges-eu-chief-critic-donald-trump-war-in-iran), have been critical of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, earning them the expected rebukes (https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5764930-trump-lambasts-uk-spain-iran/) from Trump. The White House might be too busy to follow through on threats (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c8r1mzd8vygo) “to cut off all trade” with Spain, but it will equally not put much effort into already fraught mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine. Given the dismal performance (https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/03/witkoff-kushner-trump-fail-diplomacy-iran-ukraine-gaza/) of Trump’s own efforts and those of his negotiation team, as well as the pressure (https://theconversation.com/farcical-peace-talks-in-abu-dhabi-resolve-nothing-as-ukraine-shivers-under-russias-winter-onslaught-275138) that the US had put on Ukraine rather than Russia to cut a deal, this may not be much of a loss. But US diplomatic disengagement from the Russian war against Ukraine still poses a problem as Washington is the only player with the leverage to bring both sides together and — if Trump were to decide so — achieve a just and sustainable peace agreement between them. Ukraine and its European partners may be able to prevent a Russian victory, but it will take some time for them to develop the military and political muscle to force Russia to make meaningful concessions that could pave the way towards a durable and acceptable settlement. If nothing else, Trump’s war of choice in the Middle East is another factor in prolonging (https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-trumps-plan-for-ukrainian-elections-and-a-peace-referendum-will-only-prolong-the-war-275698) the war against Ukraine. Regardless of its short-term effects, it will not make a Russian victory more likely. But it has thrown the world into additional turmoil for no good reason whatsoever, and it will delay the much-needed restoration of peace in Europe. An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation (https://theconversation.com/profiles/stefan-wolff-95635/articles) on March 5, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex (http://www.navigatingthevortex.com/) with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/podcast) via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts (https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/navigating-the-vortex/id1681458840) Spotify (https://open.spotify.com/show/720e0ukYgeWHButI1Ujxcp?si=u3DuNmHWTPqQeH0ami4KzA) Amazon/Audible (https://music.amazon.co.uk/podcasts/1f78b0b4-26df-4449-8b35-6c7461b6521a/navigating-the-vortex?ref=dm_sh_gOIOmpFgPsJixpiYl0BnPM9Ck) This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4)

2. 

   24 Feb 2026

   After four years of war, an end of the fighting in Ukraine is not in sight

   As Ukraine heads into a fifth year of defending itself against the unprovoked Russian full-scale invasion, the prospects of a just and sustainable peace agreement remain distant. On the ground, the land war continues to be in a stalemate, with the pace of Russian territorial gains now slower than some of the most protracted battles of trench warfare during the First World War. In the air war, Moscow has demonstrated a ruthless and brutal efficiency in destroying much of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The repeated destruction of power generation and distribution facilities has taken a serious toll on the Ukrainian population and economy. Yet beyond inflicting hardship, these strikes have not had the kind of strategic effect Russia needs to achieve in order to turn the military tables decisively on Ukraine. All in all, the Kremlin narrative of inevitable victory looks more like Soviet-style propaganda than a reflection of battlefield reality. President Vladimir Putin, however, is not the only world leader guilty of wishful thinking. His American counterpart, President Donald Trump, at times, also appears to make policy untethered from the real world. First, there was his claim on the campaign trail that he could end the fighting in Ukraine within 24 hours. Upon returning to the White House, Trump issued multiple ceasefire demands and associated deadlines that Putin simply ignored without incurring any cost. The latest plan from Washington is for a peace deal to be concluded between Moscow and Kyiv, approved by a Ukrainian referendum, and followed by national elections — all before June. The timeline for the American plan aside, a US-mediated deal between Russia and Ukraine remains possible. However, it is unlikely that it will take the form of the just and sustainable settlement that Kyiv and its European allies demand. If it comes to pass as a result of the ongoing trilateral negotiations currently underway, it is highly probable that Ukraine will have to make significant concessions on territory in exchange for US-backed security guarantees and a mostly European-financed package of post-war reconstruction measures. An additional bitter pill to swallow for Ukraine and Europe would be an unashamed US-Russia rapprochement with a simultaneous end to American sanctions on Russia, a flurry of economic deals between the two countries, and pressure on Ukraine’s other allies to follow suit, at least on sanctions relief and possibly on the release and return of Russian frozen assets. The other — and more likely — possibility is that not even a bad deal will be forthcoming. The Russian side has given no indication that it is willing to make any significant concessions. Moscow’s position is that Kyiv should relinquish control over the entirety of the Donbas, including territory in Ukraine’s fortress belt that Moscow has so far been unable to take by military force. In return, or under the terms of what Russia refers to as the ‘Anchorage formula’ allegedly agreed between Putin and Trump at their Alaska summit in August 2025, the Kremlin is apparently willing to freeze the current frontlines elsewhere along the more than 1,000 km long line of contact. Even at the very remote possibility that this was acceptable, or that Ukraine would be pressured into agreeing to such a deal, this would hardly seal a settlement, given that Russia continues to oppose the security guarantees currently on the table between Kyiv and its Western partners. Without them, territorial concessions make no sense for Ukraine, especially as there is no imminent danger of a collapse of Ukrainian defences. The Hungarian blockage of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine — likely instigated by the country’s Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, at the behest of both Trump, whose Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, had visited the country just before the announcement, and Putin, with whom Orban has had close ties for a long time — is not going to change Kyiv’s calculations significantly. Not only is the EU surely going to find a work-around to deal with this blockage but Orbán’s days as Ukraine’s principal foe inside the EU might be numbered given that he is trailing in opinion polls ahead of April’s parliamentary elections. As any embrace of and by Trump and Putin is unlikely to improve Orbán’s prospects for another term, the Hungarian blockage might ultimately prove temporary regardless of the outcome of April’s elections. If, as is therefore likely, Trump’s latest deadline passes without a deal being reached, the question arises what next? Trump could simply walk away from the war. He threatened to do so in the past but a likely mix of ego and the prospect of economic deals in the event of peace prevented him from doing so. Nothing suggests at the moment that this time will be different. There might be some angry exchanges and finger pointing, but after that, the current, deeply flawed negotiation process is likely to resume in some form because the alternatives are worse for all sides, Trump included. The US President could walk away and finally realise that Putin is simply not interested in peace, no matter what is on offer. But this will not lead Trump to ramp up pressure on Russia in a significant way. He has had reason and opportunity to do so on multiple occasions since returning to the White House in January 2025. He has not done so then, and there is no reason to believe that he would do so now. Trump could then instead pursue a bilateral deal with Russia. But without European participation, such a deal will be of limited benefit to both sides. The bulk of Russian foreign assets remain frozen in Europe and would very likely stay so in the absence of coordinated transatlantic action. Russia has little of value to export to the US and lacks the market conditions to make it an attractive destination for US foreign direct investment. Some US companies might return or expand their still existing operations in the country, but these will hardly be the trillion-dollar deals that Trump, and possibly Putin, envisage. Even if any such separate US-Russia deal would be of limited economic value, it would still be politically damaging, especially to transatlantic relations. That, however, also makes it less likely to happen. By June, primaries in the United States ahead of the November midterm elections will largely have concluded and Republican candidates will be less susceptible to pressure from the White House. As was already obvious in the context of Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, if necessary by force, there remains a segment of foreign policy realists among congressional Republicans who, unshackled from the leverage Trump may have held over them in the primaries, are likely to push back more against his most disruptive foreign policy stances, including when it comes to any dealing with Russia reached at the expense of the transatlantic alliance. All of these scenarios, and a likely myriad of more or less minor variations of them, contain the ingredients of a British and European strategy for what is probably another year of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The first is the utmost importance of unity behind Ukraine’s defence efforts. Across the multiple overlapping multi- and mini-lateral formats of EU, NATO, coalition of the willing, etc., there needs to be a clear message to Russia, the US, and Ukraine alike: Russia’s aggression is also Europe’s problem and will be treated as such for as long as the threat from Moscow — not just against Ukraine but against the fundamental tenets of the European security order as such — remains credible. This means, second, that Ukraine needs to be supported materially with military and economic aid and politically when it comes to pushing back against both American and Russian designs for a deal to serve the interests of the current incumbents of the White House and the Kremlin first. For a more effective political pushback, Europe needs to cultivate relations with those in the US foreign policy establishment who continue to see value in established alliance structures, especially if they reflect more balanced burden-sharing. Third, the UK and its European allies also need to think beyond Ukraine — because this is what Russia is doing as well, despite the demands of its war of aggression. Though it need not be limited to the EU-Russia borderlands, this is where the focus needs to remain for the foreseeable future. Moldova, for example, remains particularly vulnerable to Russian interference, notwithstanding the success of pro-European forces in the country in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 and 2025. Moscow still retains multiple channels of influence, including through the unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region, which, if left to fester, could significantly impede Moldova’s EU accession process and provide opportunities for renewed destabilisation. Similarly, parliamentary elections in Armenia in June will create an opportunity for the Kremlin to destabilise another of its neighbours that has increasingly turned away from Moscow and towards Brussels. Given the role of the US, and of Trump personally, in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this also offers an opportunity for the UK and Europe to cooperate with Washington in working towards constraining Russian influence in the South Caucasus region as a whole. A fourth and final ingredient in an evolving British and European strategy is a focus on becoming a credible player in the emerging new international order. This requires a certain amount of realism and modesty in aspirations and messaging. The UK is not pursuing a fast track to rejoining the EU, but closer alignment and cooperation across the English Channel is essential. Equally important is that declarations of intent, be they about a UK-EU reset or an expanding coalition of the willing, are followed with concrete action — especially on investment in defence and a more credible European deterrence posture. This means both a more capable defence industrial base and doctrine for the kind of war being fought in Ukraine and improved defence readiness and resilience at the level of society. A reconstituted European alliance, with a coalition at its heart that is not just willing but also capable of deterring Russia, is not beyond the reach of the UK and Europe. It may not be, nor ever become, a traditional great power, but by continuing to back Ukraine today and integrating it tomorrow, it will feel, and be, less vulnerable to the whims of the current or any future mercurial leader in the White House or the Kremlin. Crucially, it preserves the opportunity to rebuild the transatlantic alliance in the future, and to do so on stronger European foundations. An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Foreign Policy Centre (https://fpc.org.uk/four-years-on-europes-strategic-test-in-ukraine/) on February 24, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex (http://www.navigatingthevortex.com/) with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/podcast) via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts (https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/navigating-the-vortex/id1681458840) Spotify (https://open.spotify.com/show/720e0ukYgeWHButI1Ujxcp?si=u3DuNmHWTPqQeH0ami4KzA) Amazon/Audible (https://music.amazon.co.uk/podcasts/1f78b0b4-26df-4449-8b35-6c7461b6521a/navigating-the-vortex?ref=dm_sh_gOIOmpFgPsJixpiYl0BnPM9Ck) This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4)

3. 

   23 Feb 2026

   Navigating the Vortex | Ethnopolitics Edition | Episode 2

   On 13 February 2026, we spoke with John Nagle (https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/persons/john-nagle/) and Tamirace Fakhoury (https://fletcher.tufts.edu/academics/faculty/tamirace-fakhoury) to mark the publication of the latest edition of Ethnopolitics (https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/reno20) — a special issue on Contesting Power-sharing: Contentious Politics in Divided Societies (https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/reno20/25/2), co-edited by John and Simon Mabon (https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/global-affairs/people/simon-mabon), to which Tamirace contributed the article “How Do Semi-Authoritarian Regimes Defeat Uprisings? Lebanon’s 2019 Uprising and the Dramaturgical Performances that the Post-Civil War Regime Plays (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2024.2429272)”. John is Professor of Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast, as well as a Fellow of the Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice (https://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/institute-for-global-peace-security-justice/about-us/) and an Associate Fellow at the Institute of Irish Studies (https://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/IrishStudiesGateway/). More information about him is available here (https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/persons/john-nagle/). Tamirace joined us from Massachusetts in the United States where she works as Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. You can find out more about her by following this link (https://fletcher.tufts.edu/academics/faculty/tamirace-fakhoury). The articles we discuss in this episode can be accessed for free on our website: * John Nagle and Simon Mabon, “Contesting Power-sharing: Contentious Politics in Divided Societies (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2025.2583797)” * John Nagle and Cera Murtagh, “Contesting Power-Sharing? LGBTQ+ Activism and the Sexual Citizenship of Consociationalism (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2024.2412503)” * Tamirace Fakhoury, “How Do Semi-Authoritarian Regimes Defeat Uprisings? Lebanon’s 2019 Uprising and the Dramaturgical Performances that the Post-Civil War Regime Plays (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2024.2429272)” The whole special issue, Contesting Power-sharing: Contentious Politics in Divided Societies (Ethnopolitics 25(2), 2026), can be accessed here (https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/reno20/25/2). John’s 2009 article, “Potemkin Village: Neo-liberalism and Peace-building in Northern Ireland?” (Ethnopolitics 8(2), 2009, 173-190), is available here (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449050802593275). We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex (http://www.navigatingthevortex.com/) | Ethnopolitics Edition (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/s/ethnopolitics-edition) with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/podcast) via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: * Apple Podcasts (https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/navigating-the-vortex/id1681458840) * Spotify (https://open.spotify.com/show/720e0ukYgeWHButI1Ujxcp?si=u3DuNmHWTPqQeH0ami4KzA) * Amazon/Audible (https://music.amazon.co.uk/podcasts/1f78b0b4-26df-4449-8b35-6c7461b6521a/navigating-the-vortex?ref=dm_sh_gOIOmpFgPsJixpiYl0BnPM9Ck) * PocketCasts (https://pocketcasts.com/podcast/navigating-the-vortex/c74adba0-b8fc-013b-f3e5-0acc26574db2) * Overcast (https://overcast.fm/itunes1681458840/navigating-the-vortex) This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe (https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4)

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