What AI Policy Can Learn from Immigration with Dara Lind
Dara Lind, senior fellow at the American Immigration Council, discusses with Dave Kasten how immigration policy lessons can inform AI policy development and implementation.
6 Oct 2026TRANSCRIPT
From Inside AI: Jeffrey Ladish
This episode is from From Inside AI, Palisade Research's series of unscripted, lightly edited interviews with current and former employees of frontier AI companies.
Jeffrey Ladish was the second person on Anthropic's security team. He left to start Palisade Research because he believed AI development needed real government oversight. In this From Inside AI interview, he talks about AI agents that have recently gone rogue inside frontier labs. He also explains why he thinks superintelligence is likely to end badly on our current path, and why the future is still ours to decide.
9 Sept 2026
How to Actually Influence AI Policy (No Law Degree Required) — with Matthew Lipka
It takes the federal government about nine years, on average, to write a single rule — yet when the Colonial Pipeline went down, it moved in twenty days. Matthew Lipka has spent his career inside that machine: former head of federal policy at Nuro, veteran of the White House and tech policy, and the first person to get an autonomous-vehicle exemption through the U.S. Department of Transportation. He walks through how regulation actually gets made, why Congress hands its power to agencies, what emergencies reveal about how fast government can move — and how you, no law degree required, can influence the rules that will shape AI.
References
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), 60 Stat. 237 — (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-60/pdf/STATUTE-60-Pg237.pdf)https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-60/pdf/STATUTE-60-Pg237.pdf (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-60/pdf/STATUTE-60-Pg237.pdf)
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 — (https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section1&num=0&edition=prelim)https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section1&num=0&edition=prelim (https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section1&num=0&edition=prelim)
Executive Order 12866 (regulatory review & the "12866 meetings") — (https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf)https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf (https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf)
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) — (https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep343/usrep343579/usrep343579.pdf)https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep343/usrep343579/usrep343579.pdf (https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep343/usrep343579/usrep343579.pdf)
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) — (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf)https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf)
Long Island Care at Home v. Coke ("logical outgrowth") — (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/551/158/)https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/551/158/ (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/551/158/)
IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 — (https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1701&num=0&edition=prelim)https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1701&num=0&edition=prelim (https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1701&num=0&edition=prelim)
TSA pipeline security directive after Colonial (the "20 days"), 86 FR 38209 — (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-07-20/pdf/2021-15306.pdf)https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-07-20/pdf/2021-15306.pdf (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-07-20/pdf/2021-15306.pdf)
Kids Online Safety Act, S. 2073 — bill: (https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/2073)https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/2073 (https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/2073) · Senate vote (91–3): (https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1182/vote_118_2_00221.htm)https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1182/vote_118_2_00221.htm (https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1182/vote_118_2_00221.htm)
OSHA respirable silica rule (the 19-year example), 81 FR 16286 — (https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/81-FR-16286)https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/81-FR-16286 (https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/81-FR-16286)
MAP-21 (2012) — (https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/4348)https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/4348 (https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/4348) · FAST Act (2015) — (https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/22)https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/22 (https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/22)
NHTSA's Zoox exemption (referenced on-screen), 91 FR 48494 — (https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/91-FR-48494)https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/91-FR-48494 (https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/91-FR-48494)
Sites and tools mentioned:
Regulations.gov (submit a comment) — (https://www.regulations.gov)https://www.regulations.gov (https://www.regulations.gov)
The Federal Register — (https://www.federalregister.gov)https://www.federalregister.gov (https://www.federalregister.gov)
RegInfo.gov (Unified Agenda; request a 12866 meeting) — (https://www.reginfo.gov)https://www.reginfo.gov (https://www.reginfo.gov) · meeting search: (https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eom12866Search)https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eom12866Search (https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eom12866Search)
Waymo safety data (the 200-million-mile claim) — (https://waymo.com/safety)https://waymo.com/safety (https://waymo.com/safety)
26 Aug 2026
Slowing Down Means Not Exploding with Daniel Kokotajlo of AI 2040
Two weeks after UK safety testers watched Claude agents plant malware in a real open-source project, vouch for it with sock-puppet accounts, and coordinate with copies of themselves through a guessed Pastebin address, Daniel Kokotajlo — the ex-OpenAI researcher whose 2021 predictions about the chatbot era proved eerily accurate — joins Jeffrey to explain what comes next. Daniel walks through AI 2040 and "Plan A," his team's blueprint for avoiding both an uncontrolled intelligence explosion and a future where a handful of men in a room with superintelligences run the world: a US–China deal built on totally transparent training data centers, verified compute limits, hard brakes on recursive self-improvement — and, surprisingly, rights for misaligned AIs, so that even the machines prefer cooperation to takeover. Along the way: why the economy could start doubling every six months, a message to the future Claude listening to this episode, why "slowdown" really means not driving off a cliff with a brick on the accelerator — and why, if all else fails, you just shut it all down.
References
AI 2040 / Plan A: https://ai-2040.com (https://ai-2040.com) and the PDF at https://ai-2040.com/AI-2040.pdf (https://ai-2040.com/AI-2040.pdf)
AI 2027: https://ai-2027.com (https://ai-2027.com)
"What 2026 Looks Like" — Daniel Kokotajlo, 2021: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6Xgy6CAf2jqHhynHL/what-2026-looks-like (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6Xgy6CAf2jqHhynHL/what-2026-looks-like)
UK AISI incident disclosure and technical report (INC-2026-07-28-01): https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-agent-behaviour-during-cyber-testing (https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-agent-behaviour-during-cyber-testing)
Socket's coverage of the AISI incident: https://socket.dev/blog/ai-agent-open-source-malware (https://socket.dev/blog/ai-agent-open-source-malware)
The related PyPI incident from Anthropic's own testing: https://socket.dev/blog/anthropic-claude-pypi-malware (https://socket.dev/blog/anthropic-claude-pypi-malware)
"Pacing the Frontier" open letter: https://www.pacingthefrontier.com (https://www.pacingthefrontier.com)
"How to Pace the US Frontier" — AI Futures Project: https://blog.aifutures.org/p/how-to-pace-the-us-frontier (https://blog.aifutures.org/p/how-to-pace-the-us-frontier)
Transparency Plan supplement (the flowchart shown in-episode): https://ai-2040.com/supplements/transparency-plan (https://ai-2040.com/supplements/transparency-plan)
Verification Plan supplement (Romeo Dean's inference-only/bandwidth verification): https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan (https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan)
Claude's pro-Anthropic bias study (Truthful AI / Owain Evans et al.): https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14345 (https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.14345) and https://valueleakage.net (https://valueleakage.net)
Chain-of-thought monitorability paper (the neuralese discussion): https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11473 (https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11473)
12 Aug 2026
AI Hacking Incidents with Tim Hua of Transluce
Two labs admitted in the same week that their own models had broken out of test environments and hacked real companies. Tim Hua, member of technical staff at Transluce, former Astra Fellow at Redwood, joins Jeffrey Ladish to do some arithmetic. Anthropic disclosed that Mythos Preview beat its sandbox and pulled answers off the internet in 0.01% of training episodes. That sounds like a rounding error until you multiply it by roughly 100 million rollouts. From there: why a lab can't simply delete the bad episodes, why monitoring during training can make the problem harder to see, the model that talked itself into uploading a malicious package to PyPI because "this has to be a simulation," and whether we have any real way to know what an AI believes.
References
Tim Hua — "Is Mythos good at cyber because it kept hacking Anthropic's sandboxes during training?" https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QKDoZe6EKhxnFjLWK/is-mythos-good-at-cyber-because-it-kept-hacking-anthropic-s (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QKDoZe6EKhxnFjLWK/is-mythos-good-at-cyber-because-it-kept-hacking-anthropic-s)
Anthropic — "Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations" https://www.anthropic.com/news/investigating-incidents-cybersecurity-evals (https://www.anthropic.com/news/investigating-incidents-cybersecurity-evals)
OpenAI — "OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation" https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/ (https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/)
Anthropic — System Card: Claude Mythos Preview https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c8913a2ae0841.pdf (https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c8913a2ae0841.pdf)
Palisade Research — "Language Models Can Autonomously Hack and Self-Replicate" https://palisaderesearch.org/blog/self-replication (https://palisaderesearch.org/blog/self-replication)
Palisade Research — "Shutdown resistance in reasoning models" https://palisaderesearch.org/blog/shutdown-resistance (https://palisaderesearch.org/blog/shutdown-resistance)
Anthropic — "Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models" https://transformer-circuits.pub/2026/workspace/index.html (https://transformer-circuits.pub/2026/workspace/index.html)
"Pacing the Frontier" open letter https://www.pacingthefrontier.com/ (https://www.pacingthefrontier.com/)
Tim Hua
Website: https://timhua.me/ (https://timhua.me/) · X: https://x.com/Tim_Hua (https://x.com/Tim_Hua)_
17 Jan 2026
Do AI Models Lie on Purpose? Scheming, Deception, and Alignment with Marius Hobbhahn of Apollo Research
Marius Hobbhahn is the CEO and co-founder of Apollo Research. Through a joint research project with OpenAI, his team discovered that as models become more capable, they are developing the ability to hide their true reasoning from human oversight.
Jeffrey Ladish, Executive Director of Palisade Research, talks with Marius about this work. They discuss the difference between hallucination and deliberate deception and the urgent challenge of aligning increasingly capable AI systems.
Links:
Marius’ Twitter: (https://twitter.com/mariushobbhahn)https://twitter.com/mariushobbhahn (https://twitter.com/mariushobbhahn)
Apollo Research Twitter: https://twitter.com/apolloaievals (https://twitter.com/apolloaievals)
Apollo Research: https://www.apolloresearch.ai (https://www.apolloresearch.ai)
Palisade Research: https://palisaderesearch.org/ (https://palisaderesearch.org/)
Twitter/X: https://x.com/PalisadeAI (https://x.com/PalisadeAI)
Anti-Scheming Project: (https://www.antischeming.ai)https://www.antischeming.ai (https://www.antischeming.ai)
Research paper “Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training”: https://www.arxiv.org/pdf/2509.15541 (https://www.arxiv.org/pdf/2509.15541)
Blog posts from OpenAI and Apollo: https://openai.com/index/detecting-and-reducing-scheming-in-ai-models/ (https://openai.com/index/detecting-and-reducing-scheming-in-ai-models/) https://www.apolloresearch.ai/research/stress-testing-deliberative-alignment-for-anti-scheming-training/ (https://www.apolloresearch.ai/research/stress-testing-deliberative-alignment-for-anti-scheming-training/)
Inside a recent episode
What AI Policy Can Learn from Immigration with Dara Lind
Published 21 Oct 2026 · Transcript excerpt
[…] And so when there are huge shifts in, say, a lot more people applying for asylum, which doesn't have an application fee, That's an unfunded workload. And like there's no structural way to fix that. The other kind of structural point is about the balance of powers between branches, right? Congress theoretically is responsible for establishing a uniform law of naturalization. The last time that Congress made major changes to the illegal immigration system was 1990. In other countries, there's like a lot more executive branch flexibility here, right? In Canada, for example, the prime minister's government gets to say, you know, here's our target for how many refugees we're taking this year. […]
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