Exploring the intersection of technology and international relations from an Indian national interest perspective. <br/><br/><a href="https://hightechir.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast">hightechir.substack.com</a>
Technopolitik
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Exploring the intersection of technology and international relations from an Indian national interest perspective. <br/><br/><a href="https://hightechir.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast">hightechir.substack.com</a>
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June 28, 2023
#49 US-India's High-Tech Talks, and Concerns surrounding TikTok.
<p>Last week saw a flurry of technopolitical developments as the US and India announced a slew of technology and defense deals. In case you missed it, we had a special post dissecting the preliminary details of India’s accession to the Artemis Accords. Check it out <a target="_blank" href="https://hightechir.substack.com/p/india-the-us-and-a-diplomatic-moonshot">here</a>! Also tune in to this <a target="_blank" href="https://omny.fm/shows/all-things-policy/high-tech-developments-between-u-s-india">podcast episode</a> of All Things Policy, where Pranay Kotasthane, Aditya Ramanathan, Bharath Reddy, and Saurabh Todi from the High-Tech Geopolitics team discuss the announcements in the India-US joint statement in the field of Semiconductors, Advanced Telecommunications, and Space.</p><p>Matsyanyaaya 1: <strong>Concerns Surrounding TikTok and the Future of ‘</strong><strong>Project Texas</strong><strong>’</strong></p><p>— Anushka Saxena</p><p>On June 16, the CEO of the controversial Chinese media platform TikTok, Shou Zi Chew, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.blackburn.senate.gov/services/files/A4595D03-689A-43FF-ADBA-32C557DE3685">sent a letter</a> to US Congress Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), responding to their questions about the company surrounding the storage of data of American users on the platform. In his testimony to a House Committee of the US Congress, Shou had previously stated that "American data has always been stored in Virginia and Singapore." But now, a Forbes investigation from late May has revealed that this may not entirely be true. This investigation prompted said Senators to seek answers from TikTok, and Shou's letter has confirmed said suspicions.</p><p><strong>What did Forbes' investigation say?</strong></p><p>On May 30, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandralevine/2023/05/30/tiktok-creators-data-security-china/?sh=5139c1bc7048">Forbes published a report</a> arguing that "over the past several years, thousands of TikTok creators and businesses around the world have given the company sensitive financial information—including their social security numbers and tax IDs—so that they can be paid by the platform. But unbeknownst to many of them, TikTok has stored that personal financial information on servers in China that are accessible by employees there, Forbes has learned."</p><p>Further, their report argued: "TikTok uses various internal tools and databases from its Beijing-based parent ByteDance to manage payments to creators who earn money through the app, including many of its biggest stars in the United States and Europe. The same tools are used to pay outside vendors and small businesses working with TikTok. But a trove of records obtained by Forbes from multiple sources across different parts of the company reveals that highly sensitive financial and personal information about those prized users and third parties has been stored in China. The discovery also raises questions about whether employees who are not authorized to access that data have been able to. It draws on internal communications, audio recordings, videos, screenshots, documents marked "Privileged and Confidential," and several people familiar with the matter."</p><p><strong>…And what has Shou said in his letter to Blackburn and Blumenthal?</strong></p><p>The point of the letter is to confirm that over the past year, TikTok has collaborated closely with Oracle to implement various measures to enhance the protection of the application, systems, and the security of data belonging to its users in the United States. </p><p>They also announced that in January 2023, they had achieved a significant milestone in this endeavour – the default storage location for US user data has been changed. All US user traffic is currently being directed to Oracle Cloud Infrastructure. While TikTok's data centres in the US and Singapore are still utilized for backup purposes, the company's ongoing efforts involve removing US users' private data from our data centres. Their objective is to fully transition to Oracle cloud servers in the United States, for which, as of March 2023, they have also started deleting previously stored data from foreign servers.</p><p>But the controversy has arisen from the second main iteration of the letter, which reads: "TikTok has been clear that there are certain, limited exceptions to the definition of protected data. These exceptions are in place to help ensure interoperability of TikTok as a global platform and were determined as part of TikTok's extensive, multi-year negotiations with CFIUS that have occurred under two Administrations. Exceptions include categories such as public data, business metrics, interoperability data, and certain creator data, if a creator voluntarily signs up for a commercial program to be supported by TikTok in reaching new audiences and monetizing content. As part of Project Texas, we are also designing a trusted path to enable TikTok to respond to global government and litigation demands for documents relating to users."</p><p>This confirms that if a content creator based out of the US has subscribed to paid content promotion programmes on the platform for the sake of 'interoperability', their data has been redirected to servers abroad… including those in China.</p><p>The senators have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.blackburn.senate.gov/2023/6/icymi-tiktok-confirms-to-blackburn-and-blumenthal-that-some-u-s-user-data-is-stored-in-china">responded in an obviously indignant manner, stating</a>: "We are extremely concerned that TikTok is storing Americans' personal, private data within the reach of the Chinese government. TikTok executives appear to have repeatedly and intentionally misled Congress when answering how the company secures and protects the data of Americans. TikTok's response makes it crystal clear that Americans' data is still exposed to Beijing's draconian and pervasive spying regimes – despite the claims of TikTok's misleading public relations campaign."</p><p><strong>What is Project Texas?</strong></p><p>'Project Texas' is Shou Zi Chew's answer to the US Congress's security concerns. Through the Project, TikTok in the US would maintain local data servers disallowing any flow of information of American users outside the country, and Oracle will reportedly own these servers. Moreover, as part of the Project, TikTok might also reveal its algorithm to the US agencies for greater transparency.</p><p>At this point, the countries of the 'Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance', namely the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, as well as the European Parliament, have already collectively banned TikTok from being installed in government-issued/ federal service devices, to prevent sensitive official data from reaching the hands of China, or any externally based TikTok server that the US may have no jurisdiction over. </p><p>Moreover, a <a target="_blank" href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20230228/115363/BILLS-118HR1153ih.pdf">Bill</a> by US Senator McCaul on 'Deterring America's Technological Adversaries' Act (DATA Act) is already tabled for discussion in Congress since February this year, and it identifies TikTok and its parent company 'ByteDance' major security threats to American users' privacy. With the developments in the debate on TikTok and data governance likely to continue, the latest controversy surrounding the letter may well be the death knell that pushes the US to adopt broader legislation regulating civilian uses of the app. </p><p>Cyberpolitik Explainer : The Soviet Semiconductor Failure</p><p>— Revati Gandekar</p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiconductor#:~:text=A%20semiconductor%20is%20a%20material,behave%20in%20the%20opposite%20way.">Semiconductor</a>s are critical for technological sectors that produce electronic components such as transistors, diodes, integrated circuits, and microprocessors. These components are essential for computers, telecommunications, consumer electronics, military, and aerospace. The semiconductor industry played a pivotal role in shaping the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/electronics/The-semiconductor-revolution">technological landscape</a> of the 20th century. While the United States and other Western countries experienced significant growth and innovation in this field, the Soviet Union also made notable advancements in the semiconductor industry. This aims to analyze the rise and fall of the semiconductor industry in the USSR, exploring what contributed to its initial success, the subsequent challenges, and ultimately the industry's failure. </p><p>In the late 1950s, the USSR recognized the potential of semiconductor technology and sought to develop its industry. They established research institutes, such as the <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Research_University_of_Electronic_Technology">Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology</a> and the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.lebedev.ru/en/">Lebedev Physical Institute</a>, which focused on semiconductor research and development. Additionally, collaborations with Eastern Bloc countries, such as East Germany, helped accelerate the industry's growth.</p><p>Unlike the market-driven approach of the West industries, the USSR's semiconductor sector was primarily state-driven. The Soviet government heavily invested in research and development, providing massive funding and resources to semiconductor projects. This support allowed Soviet scientists and engineers to progress significantly in the field, albeit often in a more secretive and controlled environment.</p><p>The Soviet semiconductor industry achieved several notable milestones during its heyday. In the early <a target="_blank" href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA079928.pdf">1960s</a>, Soviet scientists developed the first <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor#:~:text=The%20first%20working%20silicon%20transistor,Texas%20Instruments%20in%20May%201954.">silicon planar transistor</a>, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000498593.pdf">breakthrough</a> that revolutionized transistor manufacturing worldwide. The USSR also made significant progress in integrated circuit technology, contributing to advancements in military electronics, space exploration, and industrial automation.</p><p>While the USSR achieved remarkable progress in the semiconductor industry, it faced numerous challenges and limitations that eventually hindered its growth. One significant factor was the lack of open collaboration and information exchange with Western countries. The USSR's <a target="_blank" href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union/Economic-policy">isolationist</a> policies limited access to global semiconductor developments, impeding the industry's ability to keep pace with international advancements. This stifled innovation, as government committees with little technical expertise decided on resource allocation, technology adoption, and production targets. The lack of market-oriented incentives hindered the industry's ability to respond to changing market dynamics and meet international standards.</p><p>One of the main challenges that the Soviet Union faced in developing its semiconductor industry was the initial ideological opposition to <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics">cybernetics</a>, which was seen as a bourgeois pseudoscience that threatened the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This attitude changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s when <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchev">Nikita Khrushchev</a> adopted a policy that encouraged computer production and scientific research. The Soviet Union realized the strategic implications of semiconductors and set up new facilities to manufacture them in cities like <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_computing_in_the_Soviet_Union">Leningrad and Riga.</a> In 1958, the Soviet government set up a whole new city, <a target="_blank" href="https://medium.com/@ali.shahed/zelenograd-the-soviet-unions-ill-fated-attempt-to-replicate-silicon-valley-13dc4c096d16">Zelenograd</a>, a technical-type Special Economic Zone, just for semiconductor manufacturing.</p><p>The Soviet Union's centralized planning and bureaucratic system also posed challenges for the semiconductor industry. This top-down approach led to inefficiencies. As a result, in 1973-74, USSR produced only basic types of semiconductors <a target="_blank" href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9140535/">(transistors</a> and diodes), and the production was close to only 2% of the US output. </p><p>However, the Soviet semiconductor industry soon encountered another problem: <a target="_blank" href="http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/69/0000474629/LEVEL-OF-TECHNOLOGY-AND-PRODUCTION-OF-SEMICONDUCTORS-IN-THE-USSR-AND-EAST-EUROP.html">technological lag</a> behind the West. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not keep up with the rapid innovation and miniaturization of Western semiconductors, especially after the invention of the integrated circuit in 1959. It also suffered from a shortage of skilled personnel, quality control, and market incentives. To overcome these difficulties, it resorted to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021716/why-ussr-collapsed-economically.asp">copying</a> Western designs and importing Western machinery and components. For example, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000498593.pdf">KR580VM80A</a> was a clone of the Intel 8080 CPU, and Soviet scientists also replicated the Texas Instruments SN-51, as these processors were able to execute several thousand instructions per second. The USSR also tried to obtain specialized production equipment and complete production processes from the <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_World#:~:text=The%20Free%20World%20is%20a,regimes%20such%20as%20communist%20states.">Free World</a>, sometimes indirectly from the US. However, this increased dependence on foreign sources violated international trade regulations and prevented original innovation. </p><p>The country faced a scarcity of raw materials, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of market-oriented incentives. Additionally, this contributed to poor quality control and an inability to compete with <a target="_blank" href="https://hsm.stackexchange.com/questions/6367/did-the-soviet-union-have-their-own-discoveries-in-the-development-of-semiconduc">Western</a> semiconductor manufacturers.</p><p>The global interests of major semiconductor-producing countries, particularly the United States and its allies, also influenced the USSR's failure in the industry. The Cold War rivalry intensified the competition between the Soviet Union and the West. The US and its allies <a target="_blank" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48713460.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A84159076a3c7f05cd97e21d330d89d2a&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">pursued</a> technological advancements in semiconductors to gain a competitive edge in various industries, including telecommunications, computers, and consumer electronics. </p><p>With the <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution_of_the_Soviet_Union">collapse of the Soviet Union</a> in 1991, the semiconductor industry in the USSR experienced a rapid decline. It marked the end of its semiconductor industry as a coherent entity. Most of the Soviet computer manufacturers ceased operations or switched to other products. A few companies that survived into the 1990s used foreign components and have yet to achieve significant production volumes. The economic turmoil, political instability, and transition to a market-based economy further eroded the industry. The dismantling of the planned economy also led to a brain drain, as skilled professionals looked for opportunities in the private sector or emigrated to other countries.</p><p>The Soviet Union had some achievements in this field, such as creating the first electronic computer in continental Europe (<a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MESM">MESM</a>) and developing some local semiconductor facilities. However, it faced many challenges, including ideological opposition, technological lag, foreign dependence, and internal disorganization. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the fragmentation and decline of its semiconductor industry. </p><p>In conclusion, complete government intervention in the semiconductor industry in USSR had <a target="_blank" href="https://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/download/691/659/2987">adverse effects</a> on isolating innovation and lagging behind foreign rivals. The government controlled and centralized the semiconductor industry but failed to foster innovation and competitiveness. The government intervention isolated it as it lagged behind the US and its allies in terms of technology, production, and market share. While the USSR made significant strides in semiconductor research and development, the industry's ultimate decline can be attributed to factors such as limited international collaboration, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/1990-802-11-Brooks.pdf">centralized planning</a>, economic challenges, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Despite its eventual demise, the legacy of the Soviet semiconductor industry serves as a reminder of the importance of collaboration, innovation, and market-oriented policies.</p><p>Matsyanyaaya 2: The Fission Factor in India-US Ties</p><p>— Saurabh Todi</p><p>Last month Science and Technology Minister Jitendra Singh <a target="_blank" href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1879298">revealed</a> that Indian scientists are working on developing small modular reactors, or SMRs, one of the most promising emerging technologies in nuclear power. The interest in new technology and India's ambitious <a target="_blank" href="https://www.livemint.com/news/india/government-approves-installation-of-10-nuclear-reactors-in-india-to-add-22-480-mw-by-2031-at-a-cost-of-rs-1-05-000-crores-11680695375299.html">plan</a> to build 10 new reactors in a decade is evidence of an enduring commitment to nuclear energy. Recently, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india/">India-US Joint Statement</a> following PM Modi's State Visit also affirmed nuclear energy as a necessary resource to meet our nations' climate, energy transition, and energy security needs. Both leaders also noted the ongoing discussion on developing next-generation small modular reactor technologies in a collaborative mode for the domestic market as well as for export. </p><p>The nuclear industry is undergoing a renaissance. Over 50 nuclear reactors are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/video/c6be962e-ce91-4954-afad-a9b6bf86d7c8">under construction</a> globally today. Even countries like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/6329e02a-d3e9-4812-9062-d5fda8ad7c61">South Korea</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-22/japan-nuclear-energy-phase-out-reversal/101803800">Japan</a>, which were planning to phase out nuclear power, have reconsidered or scaled back their decisions. The European Union's <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/eu-parliament-vote-green-gas-nuclear-rules-2022-07-06/">inclusion</a> of nuclear power as a sustainable investment has further enhanced its appeal. Technological advancements led by start-ups and established companies have further improved the long-term outlook for nuclear power. Innovations such as SMRs, pebble-bed reactors, and molten-salt reactors aim to enhance the safety, flexibility in size, and economic viability of nuclear plants. China also recently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3224183/china-gives-green-light-nuclear-reactor-burns-thorium-fuel-could-power-country-20000-years">issued</a> an operational permit for its first experimental thorium-based reactor.</p><p>This sector is ripe for further and intensified cooperation between India-US and other close partners such as Japan and Australia.</p><p>Matsyanyaaya 3: High-Tech Takes Centre-Stage</p><p>— Pranay Kotasthane</p><p>I don’t think any serious policy analyst—even five years ago—would have anticipated that the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/fact-sheet-republic-of-india-official-state-visit-to-the-united-states/">press briefing</a> of an Indian PM’s Official State Visit to the US would headline concrete actions on high-tech areas such as semiconductors, critical minerals, telecommunications, Space, Quantum Computing, and Artificial Intelligence.</p><p>Nevertheless, here we are. Technology is now the centrepiece of the India-US partnership. This technology framework includes strategic technologies, such as jet engine manufacturing in India and space, and also commercial technologies, such as telecommunications, optical fibres, and semiconductors.</p><p>How Does it Matter?</p><p>Technology occupying the pole position in India-US relations is a big change in the foreign policy outlooks on technology partnerships. Here’s why.</p><p>Phase 1.0</p><p>After its independence, India interacted with many countries in the West to access advanced industrial technologies. The US specifically assisted India’s nuclear and space programmes, helped develop IIT Kanpur, and contributed to the Green Revolution.</p><p>Phase 2.0</p><p>But technology became a sore point as the Cold War picked up pace. India faced stringent denial of technology from international regimes in the nuclear and space sectors. The denial of Indian membership into multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) cast a long shadow on India’s foreign policy outlook. The US came to be seen as a technology denier. India’s default stance over the next five decades was to protect its turf in global technological fora while simultaneously developing and shielding domestic capabilities.</p><p>This is why the civil nuclear deal in 2005 was such a big deal. It helped India and the US move on from a low-level equilibrium. However, technology still remained a marginal area of cooperation at a time when terrorism and American support for Pakistan gated progress in other sectors.</p><p>Phase 3.0</p><p>The Modi-Biden Summit is a firm indication that India’s foreign policy outlook on technology has changed. Contributing factors are a growing domestic technological base; an increased presence of Indian talent in the global technology ecosystem; emergent geopolitical realities concerning China; and the rising contribution of crosscutting technologies in national power.</p><p>The Indian foreign policy establishment now has a far more positive view of technology and the opportunities it offers for collaboration and competition, apart from contestation. India also realises that technology is now a global enterprise where autarchy is not an option. The contemporary concern is to manage interdependence and make technological supply chains trusted, transparent and resilient. More recently, India’s advances in large-scale digital public infrastructure—payments, identity and data-sharing—give it the confidence to use technology to deepen diplomatic ties.</p><p>As for the US, technology has become a primary driver for addressing the China challenge. Nuclear weapons make large-scale conventional conflict unlikely. Similarly, China’s disproportionate role in material supply chains makes any large-scale economic decoupling costly. Consequently, contestation has been in the high-technology domain.</p><p>Apart from the denial of technology to China, it has also meant that the US has changed the foreign policy use of technology towards its partners. Cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement showed that the US was now willing to share sensitive technologies with partners to counter China. Back then, in the context of India’s dependence on Russia for defence systems, I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/ukraine-india-must-look-beyond-russia-101647271666342.html">wrote</a>:</p><p>It is thus in the West’s interest to apply this new technology alliance mindset to India. As more options become available, India will find it easier to reduce its dependence on Russia.</p><p>It seems this has come true to an extent. The US has been more forthcoming in sharing technology than opening its markets. The FTA with India remains a non-starter, but technology collaboration has grown rapidly.</p><p>What does it Imply?</p><p>High-tech cooperation is also not as high-stakes as the more contentious areas like trade and the South China Sea. The India-US relationship is so far behind the production possibility frontier on technology, trade and defence that there are enough low-hanging fruits to pick. And that’s exactly what we are seeing now.</p><p>In edition <a target="_blank" href="https://publicpolicy.substack.com/p/165-vishwaguru-max#details">#165</a>, I proposed a tri-axis framework to look at the India-US relationship: state-to-state relations, state-to-people relations, and people-to-people relations. There has never been a problem on the people-to-people axis. As the State Visit shows, state-to-state relations have also turned a corner. However, it is the state-to-people axis that is the problematic axis. Many Indians still seem to harbour a deep frustration with the American State. On the other hand, many Americans also have doubts about India as a partner of strategic importance.</p><p>Only the two administrations could do something to break this ceiling. By delivering on the asymmetric promises under the technology and defence agreements, the state-to-people axis will finally move on from recollections of the technology denial regime. The announcements are just the beginning; a lot depends on the execution from both sides in these areas.</p><p><strong>Note</strong>: this piece was earlier published on <a target="_blank" href="https://publicpolicy.substack.com/p/216-thick-and-fast">Anticipating the Unintended #216</a>. Check it out <a target="_blank" href="https://publicpolicy.substack.com/">here</a>!</p><p>Our Reading Menu</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/genetically-engineered-insects-dbt-guidelines-problems-uncertainty/article67014161.ece">Explainer</a>] The problem with India’s new guidelines on genetically modified insects, by Dr. Shambhavi Naik.</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-mustnt-miss-this-chance-to-supercharge-its-electronic-goods-industry-10855751.html">Op-ed</a>] India mustn’t miss this chance to supercharge its electronic goods industry, by Anupam Manur and Pranay Kotasthane.</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/debate-over-india-s-manufacturing-policy-pli-vs-trade-policy-and-tariffs-11687457188234.html">Op-ed</a>] Our PLI schemes are in need of a coherent trade policy, by Satya S. Sahu.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://hightechir.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1">hightechir.substack.com</a>
May 31, 2023
#47 Of Measured Cyberspace Regulations and Lofty Space Ambitions
<p>Matsyanyaaya: Insights from recent OEWG discussions on Information and Communications Technologies</p><p>— Anushka Saxena</p><p>The militarisation of cyberspace is a reality. And to enable states to discuss and adopt common rules for global governance of cyberspace, on 31 December 2020, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution <a target="_blank" href="https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/240">75/240</a> establishing an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on the security of and in the use of Information and Communications Technologies. The mandate for the Group extends from 2021 to 2025.</p><p>The Group recently concluded its informal, inter-sessional meetings on 26 May, and deliberations put forth by various states give us some insights into the kind of talking points we could look out for during the fifth Substantive Session of the Group, scheduled for July 2023.</p><p>To summarise, various stakeholders, ranging from governments and representatives of UN bodies to scholars from think tanks and technology corporations, submitted ideas about what the 2023 Annual Progress Report (APR) should entail. All of their ideas either build on or expand what has already been discussed in the previous substantive and informal sessions in 2023 or the 2022 APR. Some interesting ideas are as follows:</p><p>* Iran submitted a <a target="_blank" href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/IR_Iran_WP_PoC_directory_May_2023.pdf">Working Paper</a> on establishing a provisional directory of 'Points of Contact' (PoCs) on ICT and cybersecurity.</p><p>● The first proposal to develop such a global directory was tabled in the UN Governmental Group of Experts Reports of 2013 (A/68/98). Now, every GGE and OEWG discussion notes progress on the directory.</p><p>● The aim of this directory shall be for states to appoint field experts in technical or diplomatic positions (or both), which would be a part of a global PoC network debating everything from responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and the applicability of international law to defining threats to ICT.</p><p>● As we know, the current Indian government has quite a knack for portals, and to formalise the creation of a PoCs global directory, India, too, has <a target="_blank" href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/WP_GCSCP.pdf">proposed the creation of a Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal</a>. The proposal, submitted by India's Permanent Representative in New York in July 2022, states that such a Portal shall be voluntarily updated by states and maintained by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.</p><p>* The UNOCT/UNCCT and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate presented proposals for 'capacity building'. The <a target="_blank" href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/UNCCT_Global_CT_Programme_on_Cybersecurity_and_New_Technologies.pdf">proposal by the former</a> was basically about glorifying the successes of its Global CounterTerrorism Programme on Cybersecurity and New Technologies. But the <a target="_blank" href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/CTED_OEWG_Presentation_v5_May_22_for_circulation.pdf">latter proposal</a>, presented by the UNCTED, emphatically highlights the challenge of malicious online activity by rogue non-state actors and how existing counter-terrorism infrastructure can be leveraged to deal with it.</p><p>● The important recommendation is to develop comprehensive training programmes for law enforcement personnel and criminal justice practitioners working with digital evidence. The mention of the latter may be an important signal of more private sector participation in navigating the legalities of what constitutes 'terrorism' in cyberspace.</p><p>* Submissions from the private sector mainly highlighted which governmental proposals are the most crucial for focus on in the next substantive session and how they can be expanded or narrowed down:</p><p>● Stimson Center's submission iterated that the two major emerging technologies states should agree on are common threats to ICT Security are ransomware and Artificial Intelligence.</p><p>● It should be noted that both El Salvador and Czechia had made statements during the last substantive session in March on the need for developing standards on 'responsible state behaviour' in new and emerging tech like AI and Quantum. But these efforts would be futile until states can first agree on what harmful use of AI/ Quantum is, given the dual nature of such technologies, and then move on to standard-setting.</p><p>● DCX Technologies presented anecdotes on how to avert a ransomware attack and engage with the attacker. Two suggestions stand out from their <a target="_blank" href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technologies_-_(2021)/DXC_Technology_Company_OEWG_Intervention_-_The_Multinational_Company_Perspective_on_Multi-Stakeholder_Trust_and_Transparency__24_May_2023.pdf">four-page intervention</a> – one, that knowledge of critical infrastructure is essential to know how to protect it (such as by using enterprise security tools to detect malicious behaviour), and second, that any response to a large-scale ransomware attack such as the one DCX faced in 2020 requires a transparent, multi-stakeholder mitigation model.</p><p>If adopted and developed, these ideas could provide meaningful direction for the next set of discussions at the OEWG-ICT. However, if we look at some of the concerns governments presented during the fourth substantive session of the Group earlier in March, we can safely conclude that some of these ideas are a massive jump ahead of the tide. For example, India's primary concern during the session was as fundamental as something can be – for states to converge on their definitions and interpretations of international law! Similarly, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Kenya++repository+of+common+threats%2C+vectors%2C+and+actors+oewg&sxsrf=APwXEdct8xY4NOn8lzovb8yVcJOhzgSY0Q%3A1685373930877&ei=6sN0ZIyeNfvKseMPuriEkAg&ved=0ahUKEwiMu9qT65r_AhV7ZWwGHTocAYIQ4dUDCA8&uact=5&oq=Kenya++repository+of+common+threats%2C+vectors%2C+and+actors+oewg&gs_lcp=Cgxnd3Mtd2l6LXNlcnAQAzoFCAAQogQ6BAghEAo6BwghEKABEApKBAhBGABQAFjRLGC9LmgAcAF4AIABswKIAZwLkgEHMC42LjEuMZgBAKABAcABAQ&sclient=gws-wiz-serp">Kenya's proposal</a> entailed that states at least converge on how to define 'common threats in the cyberspace'.</p><p>This is, however, not to say that there exist no agreements whatsoever – states at the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/whats-new-with-cybersecurity-negotiations-oewg-2021-2025-fourth-substantive-session">OEWG have now come to agree</a> that the UN Charter is readily applicable to cybersecurity (especially provisions under Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 33). In doing so, they have cemented the idea that existing global governance institutions like the International Court of Justice can be utilised even to resolve cyber-incident disputes peacefully. This has not stopped countries like Russia and Syria from proposing a new legally-binding mechanism to govern state behaviour in ICT, citing the inability of existing mechanisms to do so. </p><p>Overall, some convergence exists on building capacity, creating a global knowledge base involving both state and non-state actors, and creating a due diligence mechanism for states to respond to malicious activities originating from their territory. The next Substantive Session would be vital to understand how states respond to these ideas and whether they can agree to resolve some of the fundamental challenges facing the OEWG's ambitious goals.</p><p>Cyberpolitik : A “broadly” unclear Light-Touch Regulation for India’s Online Gaming Industry.</p><p>— Satya Sahu</p><p>Online gaming is one of the fastest-growing segments of India’s digital economy, with millions of users playing various games on platforms ranging from smartphones, consoles and PCs. India’s gaming population is pegged to reach 700 million by 2025, with a significant portion of players spending real money on games. (current conversion rate is about 24% or <a target="_blank" href="https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/india-to-have-700-million-gamers-by-2025-report-11669970090056.html">120 million players.</a> It is a good bet that this trend will comfortably allow the Indian online gaming industry's ambitions of growing to <a target="_blank" href="https://m.economictimes.com/tech/technology/india-to-lure-manufacturers-with-electronics-repair-pilot-project/articleshow/100622892.cms">USD 8.6 billion by 2027</a>. </p><p>However, online gaming also comes with challenges and risks, because it can serve as a pathway to gambling using real money, addiction, an easy target for cybercrime, and exposure to illegal illicit content.</p><p>So of course, the Ministry of Electronics and IT (MeitY) notified amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, related to online gaming in <a target="_blank" href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1918383">early April 2023.</a> The amendments aim to enforce greater due diligence by online gaming intermediaries, such as platforms, websites, and apps that offer online games, and to protect users from illegal betting and wagering online. The amendments also envisage the creation of self-regulatory bodies (SROs) that will register and certify permissible online games and resolve complaints through a grievance redressal mechanism.</p><p>In most regards, the amendments have garnered <a target="_blank" href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/gaming-firms-seek-clarity-on-revised-rules/articleshow/99325441.cms">applause</a> from the gaming industry for being an unusual example of a light-touch regulation and promoting the idea of a trustworthy self-regulating market. It is a rare example of an enabling legislation meant to promote regulatory certainty without much in the way of prescriptive mandates. But with the lack of prescription, also comes uncertainty, particularly in the matter of definitions involved in deciding what constitutes "online gaming", "betting”, or "gambling. While jurisprudence across the country is settled on the distinction being whether the game in question has an element of skill or an element of chance (with the latter legally prohibited), the Rules do not provide any assistance in making that distinction clear.</p><p>There is also a significant issue about the implementation of these regulations due to the fact that gambling is a state list subject under the Indian constitution; however, the discussion on federalism in this context is beyond the scope of this post.</p><p>This post’s focus, however, is the definition of “user harm” in the context of online gaming. As per the explanation to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Information%20Technology%20%28Intermediary%20Guidelines%20and%20Digital%20Media%20Ethics%20Code%29%20Rules%2C%202021%20%28updated%2006.04.2023%29-.pdf">Rule 3(1)(b)(ii)</a>, “user harm” and “harm” mean any effect which is detrimental to a user or child, as the case may be.</p><p>Even at a cursory glance, this definition is unusually broad and vague, leaving much room for interpretation and discretion by the government and the SROs. For instance, would considerations of obscenity, defamation, hate speech, discrimination, harassment, cyberbullying, cyberstalking, phishing, hacking, identity theft, addiction, or compulsive behaviour etc be relevant while defining “harm” in the context of online gaming? </p><p>How will these terms be defined and measured? Who decides whether an online game is likely to incite any of these harms? What are the criteria and standards for such decisions? How will the users be informed and educated about these harms and their consequences?</p><p>Moreover, a definition of user harm that does not take into account the diversity and complexity of online gaming genres, formats, modes, and audiences would be woefully limited. Online gaming is not a monolithic phenomenon, but a rapidly evolving one, with different types of games catering to different players.</p><p>In games, the depiction of drug use, violence, and sexually explicit content is handled by certification and age-rating systems like ESRB and PEGI in the<a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_game_content_rating_system"> US and the UK</a> respectively, with generally consistent decision-making. In the case of India, the Rules mention the objective of tackling content-related concerns in terms of depiction of violent or inappropriate content. However, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Information%20Technology%20%28Intermediary%20Guidelines%20and%20Digital%20Media%20Ethics%20Code%29%20Rules%2C%202021%20%28updated%2006.04.2023%29-.pdf">Rules 4A(8) and 4C</a> have imposed an obligation on the SRO to ensure that the verification process to determine a game’s permissibility be based on a self-devised framework which assesses whether an online game contains adequate safeguards against user harm. The only considerations to be used while formulating said framework, are “self harm and psychological harm”, which do not do much to circumscribe our definitional woes. </p><p>The idea of the SROs to also act as a classification and age-rating body is a possible step in the right direction assuming that multiple SROs will not create conflicting frameworks for verification. While India’s approach may end up as a beefed-up version of the US and the UK (with legal liabilities on the online gaming intermediaries, and direct oversight of the Union Government etc.) , the case of Australia’s National Classification Code should serve as a warning of the kind of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ign.com/articles/lets-finally-fix-australias-video-game-rating-system-and-properly-this-time">distortions</a> that can be created in a regulatory regime when overbroad concepts are used to define what constitutes “harm” to the player. Australia’s Office of Film and Literature Classification, bound by their legislative regime, can reject certification for a game if its depiction of sex and drug use is potentially portrayed “positively”. Because age-ratings and classifications directly impact the commercial success of games (as well as movies, which is usually used as a counterpoint against controversial classification systems which do not keep up with the changing nature of multimedia consumption), the Indian gaming market can potentially find themselves reworking key aspects of their games just to be able to get them onto the market. It is a costly endeavour to say the least.</p><p>As all these teething questions abound, one only hopes that a consistent framework is proposed to guide interpretations regarding the ambit of "user harm" before dispute redressal and adjudication processes inevitably commence in the future.</p><p>Antariksh Matters : China’s in a Hurry to Get to the Moon</p><p>— Aditya Ramanathan</p><p>China has announced an official deadline of 2030 for landing humans on the lunar surface. On Monday, Lin Xiqiang, the deputy head of the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/29/world/asia/china-space-moon-2030.html">said</a> the mission to put humans on the Moon was underway and would include a programme of research during short visits. </p><p>Lin’s announcement confirms a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.space.com/china-land-astronaut-on-the-moon-2030">public comment</a> in April by Wu Weiren, a scientist with China’s lunar exploration programme, who said putting humans on the Moon by 2030 was “not a problem”. </p><p>China has been steadily developing its crewed lunar programme. In 2022, it <a target="_blank" href="https://www.space.com/china-crew-launching-moon-rocket-2027-debut">unveiled</a> a model of a 90-metre-long moon rocket scheduled to undergo a flight test in 2027. Earlier in 2019, a promotional video <a target="_blank" href="https://www.space.com/china-new-spacecraft-crewed-moon-missions.html">showed off</a> what appeared to be a crewed vehicle for deep space travel being developed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST). </p><p>China’s ongoing pursuit of sustained human presence in low Earth orbit will contribute to its ability to send people to the Moon. Lin’s official confirmation came at a press conference in which he also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/china-plans-land-astronauts-moon-2030-expand-space-station-bring-forei-rcna86654">presented</a> the new three-person crew for the Tiangong space station, which will launch into orbit this week, replacing <a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/space-launches-exploration-science-aerospace-technology-china-f57fee632b5cff88d82a995ed6450ed9">three others</a> who have been inhabiting the space station for six months. The experience with Tiangong will especially come in handy if China manages to proceed to the next stage of its lunar project: setting up a permanent base on the Moon. </p><p><strong>Lunar Living</strong></p><p>In 2021, China and Russia entered into an agreement to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56342311">establish</a> a permanent presence on the Moon. Eventually dubbed International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), the project was meant to be a direct counterpart to the United States’ Artemis programme, which, as of this writing, still intends to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nasa.gov/feature/artemis-iii">return humans</a> to the Moon by 2025 and eventually <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis/">set up</a> a permanent presence on the lunar surface and in orbit.</p><p>In April, Wu publicly <a target="_blank" href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3218340/chinas-moon-ambitions-take-shape-construction-road-map-research-station">discussed</a> a multi-stage plan for the ILRS up to 2050. This would include uncrewed missions and the setting up of a “basic version” that will be followed by a “full version” put together by 2040. Other stages include setting up a nuclear power source and research infrastructure. As with Artemis, China plans to support all this by putting a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/china-unveils-plan-build-satellite-system-space-exploration-2023-04-26/">large constellation</a> of satellites into lunar orbit for position navigation and timing (PNT), relay communications to the dark side of the Moon, and remote sensing. </p><p><strong>Earthly Constraints</strong></p><p>ILRS may have begun as a Russia-China collaboration, but since the outbreak of the war with Ukraine, Russia has been conspicuous by its absence from recent Chinese statements. Instead, China has <a target="_blank" href="https://time.com/6218389/china-russia-moon-missions/">focused</a> on its own plans and has sought other foreign partners for its upcoming Chang’e uncrewed missions to the Moon. </p><p>China’s lunar ambitions are also evidently fuelled by its rivalry with the United States. However, China does not have the option of blending competition with a bit of cooperation. In 2011, the US introduced the so-called ‘Wolf Amendment’, which <a target="_blank" href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ55/html/PLAW-112publ55.htm">effectively bans</a> US government funding to be used in cooperation with any Chinese entity without clearance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While this is not technically an outright ban on space collaboration with China, its effect is much the same. </p><p>Indeed, it seems clear that NASA is determined to keep away from China. NASA’s administrator Bill Nelson has made <a target="_blank" href="https://spacenews.com/nelson-supports-continuing-restrictions-on-nasa-cooperation-with-china/">alarmist remarks</a> about China appropriating lunar territory, presumably to bolster support for the Artemis programme. However, if China and the US are engaged in a space race to the Moon, it is a relatively muted affair at the moment. Top politicians have not expended political capital on the issue, and space agencies have not seen an explosion in their budgets. The lunar ambitions of great powers will continue to be subject to Earthly constraints like economic downturns, wars, stubborn technological challenges, and myriad other pressing issues. </p><p>Our Reading Menu</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/4H1qEgbkaCAhBI0KeGQKZT?si=_BYeJOaeTm2pBqDkc143cQ&nd=1">Podcast</a>] - A Day in the Life of a Cop, a new limited series on 'policing' on All Things Policy, by Shrikrishna Upadhyay and Javeed Ahmed.</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/rs-2000-note-withdrawal-no-demonetisation-redux-but-rbi-could-have-done-it-better-10627841.html">Op-ed</a>] Rs 2,000 Note Withdrawal: No demonetisation redux but RBI could have done it better, by Anupam Manur.</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150">Report</a>] Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelly M. Sayler.</p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://hightechir.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1">hightechir.substack.com</a>
May 17, 2023
#46 Numerology of conflict and cooperation in technology
<p><strong>Biopolitik: The Power of Four: Biomanufacturing and the Quad</strong></p><p>— Saurabh Todi</p><p>A biological revolution is underway in global manufacturing. Products produced from genetic engineering and biomanufacturing techniques are replacing many chemical, industrial and farm-based products. According to a 2020 McKinsey <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/life-sciences/our-insights/the-bio-revolution-innovations-transforming-economies-societies-and-our-lives">report</a>, the substitution of chemical products with biological alternatives through modern biotechnology has the potential to produce up to 60 per cent of the physical inputs required by the global economy. Similar modern biotechnology efforts are underway for milk, meat, pharmaceuticals, oils and numerous other industries. Individually, these industries are worth many billions or trillions of dollars. Combined, they make biotechnology one of the most economically lucrative emerging technologies.</p><p>However, beyond the obvious economic value, there is significant strategic and social value in modern biotechnologies. The products produced by modern biotechnology are or will be essential for producing food, energy, and health management. Those that control the IP and supply chains will potentially control key determinants of society’s technological progress. There are also numerous potential military applications for biotechnology that range from food security to new, lightweight polymers to understanding the potential of highly effective biological weapons (which are banned under international law).</p><p>Given the immense economic and strategic importance of these technologies, it is vital that countries do not place themselves in a vulnerable position. The Quad has sought to address this potential vulnerability by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/fact-sheet-quad-summit/">establishing</a> a Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group that will monitor trends in critical and emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology, genome sequencing, and biomanufacturing, and also identify opportunities for cooperation within Quad.</p><p>China plans to establish its dominance in biomanufacturing as well. In a Chinese government document on building the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202205/P020220510324220702505.pdf">bioeconomy</a>, a central theme was biomanufacturing at scale, including plastics, oils and agri-food technology. The ASPI critical technology tracker <a target="_blank" href="https://techtracker.aspi.org.au/tech/biological-manufacturing/?colours=true">shows</a> that academics in China publish more of the top 10% of most-cited academic papers for biomanufacturing than in any other country. Given China’s track record in establishing a lead in several emerging technologies, There’s good reason to believe China will build its biomanufacturing base faster than its competitors.</p><p>To capitalise on the economic potential of the biomanufacturing industry and address potential supply chain vulnerabilities, we recommended that Quad countries establish a biomanufacturing hub in India. The proposed Quad-led hub would invest in three main areas: strengthening physical infrastructure, bolstering workforce capabilities, and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p><p>Researchers at the Takshashila Institution, Saurabh Todi and Shambhavi Naik, along with researchers at Australian National University, Dirk van der Kley and Daniel Pavlich, have explored this idea in <a target="_blank" href="https://takshashila.org.in/research/the-quad-should-commit-to-a-bio-hub-in-india">detail</a> in a recently published as a Discussion Document. The recommendation was published as op-eds in publications like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-quad-should-commit-to-a-biomanufacturing-hub-in-india/">ASPI Strategist</a>.</p><p><strong>Matsyanyaaya: </strong>Preparing for the quantum leap</p><p>— Rijesh Panicker</p><p>The National Mission for Quantum Technologies and Applications (NM-QTA) seeks to strengthen India’s research and development ecosystem in various quantum technologies like quantum communications, quantum computing, quantum sensing and quantum materials. It will also look to build 50-100 qubit quantum computers within the next 5-8 years.</p><p>With an outlay of ₹6,000 crores over the next eight years, NM-QTA represents a significant step forward from the Quantum Enabled Science and Technology (QueST) research program, funded by the Department of Science and Technology (DST) for ₹80 crore.</p><p>India has also sought international collaboration in this area. Among these is a partnership between the National Science Foundation in the US and Indian science agencies as part of the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in several areas, including quantum technologies, an Indo-US quantum coordination mechanism to facilitate research and collaboration, and an agreement with Finland, which includes setting up virtual quantum centres at three institutes in collaboration with Finnish academia.</p><p>Three key factors explain this acceleration in investment in quantum technologies.</p><p>First, quantum technologies are disruptive in their positive and negative impact. Quantum computers use quantum bits (qubits) to perform calculations based on quantum mechanical principles, allowing them to solve certain problems exponentially faster than traditional computers, which use classical bits (0 or 1) for computation. This is because qubits can exist in multiple states simultaneously (both 0 and 1), enabling quantum computers to perform many calculations at once, whereas classical bits can only exist in one state at a time. In areas such as material sciences and chemistry, quantum computers could prove groundbreaking, helping develop new and innovative molecules and materials at a rate faster than ever. Similarly, quantum secure communications significantly improve our cyber security and threat-detection capabilities. </p><p>Conversely, quantum computers above a certain size (measured in qubits) can easily break the encryption algorithms that secure most of our data today. Any actor – either state or non-state – that captures financial, military and infrastructure-related data critical to our national interest only needs to hold onto it until quantum computers are of a certain capability to be able to decrypt the data. This leaves us vulnerable to the inevitable progress in quantum computing.</p><p>The second factor is the global geopolitical environment. China and the US are battling for strategic advantage, especially in emerging technologies. Countries will protect their core technology, push for their standards and maintain close control over their allied supply chains. In quantum, for example, China has chosen to push its path forward. Similarly, India should not simply depend on its allies. In the 1990s, Russia was not allowed to fully transfer cryogenic engine technology to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) due to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that existed. Ultimately, ISRO developed its own indigenous cryogenic engine in 2014. We must avoid something similar happening to us in the quantum space.</p><p>We can see this playing out in the area of quantum communications, where countries like China, Japan, and South Korea have demonstrated their own quantum secure communication networks. The standards for quantum communications are still being developed, and whoever influences these standards gains an advantage. </p><p>In the quantum computing space, there are multiple methods to build a quantum computing core, each with its strengths and weaknesses. No one technology has a clear path to a viable, large-scale quantum computer. The winner of this race will undoubtedly have a long-term advantage over its competitors. </p><p>A third reason to consider is our relative weakness in high-tech research and development (R&D). India has spent about 0.7% of its GDP on R&D annually over the last decade. In particular, the government accounts for over 55% of all R&D investments in India. In contrast, China spends about 2.1% and the US 3% of GDP on research, both with high levels of private sector participation. Compare the nearly $1.2 billion investment in quantum computing just in 2022 by the private sector in the US with the National Quantum Mission (NM-QTA) $730 million budget over the next eight years. </p><p>A recent study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) comparing quantum investments across countries shows India lagging the US and China, both in terms of trained manpower and in terms of research conducted (as measured by highly cited papers; probably a biased metric for quality of research, but a metric nonetheless).</p><p>We must choose where to be “Atmanirbhar” and where we want to depend on others. India must decide where to wait and watch and where to go now. In some areas, like quantum communications, we have already decided to go, which is the right move.</p><p>As a matter of good strategy, India must identify those parts of the quantum technology space where we need to maintain technological independence and diversity. A considered allocation of resources to build infrastructure, fund and encourage research, train manpower, and participate in and influence global standards is a great path forward.</p><p>Antariksh Matters: China’s secretive space plane</p><p>— Aditya Ramanathan</p><p>China’s enigmatic space plane landed horizontally on Earth on May 8 after 276 days in orbit, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3219753/chinas-secretive-spacecraft-returns-earth-after-9-month-mission">according</a> to the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).</p><p>The uncrewed reusable vehicle was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.space.com/china-launches-reusable-test-spacecraft-mystery-mission">launched</a> in August 2022 on a Long March 2F rocket. This was the second such mission involving a reusable vehicle. In September 2020, a reusable craft was put into orbit for just two days, during which time it deployed two small objects into orbit. </p><p>The recently concluded mission also involved putting a payload into orbit. On October 31, 2022, about three months after its launch, the craft <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1587287130371399680">deployed</a> an object that may have been a small companion satellite meant to monitor the craft. Chinese crewed craft have <a target="_blank" href="https://spacenews.com/chinas-mystery-spaceplane-releases-object-into-orbit/">released</a> similar monitoring satellites in the past.</p><p>The space situational awareness company Leolabs <a target="_blank" href="https://spacenews.com/chinas-spaceplane-conducted-proximity-and-capture-maneuvers-with-subsatellite-data-suggests/">tracked</a> the Chinese craft and has concluded that it docked with an ‘Object J’ (most likely the same monitoring satellite) two or three times. Leolabs also concluded that the space plane had an independent capacity to manoeuvre and propel itself while in orbit.</p><p><strong>Everyone Likes Spaceplanes</strong></p><p>States have been experimenting with space planes for decades. The erstwhile US Space Shuttle was the most prominent example of a reusable crewed vehicle that was launched vertically and landed horizontally.</p><p>However, most ongoing space plane programmes are uncrewed, and some have explicit military roles. For instance, Boeing is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3217077/x-37b-orbital-test-vehicle-concludes-sixth-successful-mission/">developing</a> the uncrewed X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), which is operated by the US Space Force. The X-37B is already considerably ahead of China’s space plane programme, having completed six missions, the last of which was in orbit for 908 days. Like China’s space planes, the X-37B is capable of placing objects in orbit, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.usafa.org/News/FalconSAT8">such as</a> the experimental FalconSAT-8 for the US Air Force. </p><p>Other countries have been looking to develop space planes of their own. India took a modest first step in this direction in April when it dropped a prototype 6.5 metre-long uncrewed space plane called the Reusable Launch Vehicle from a helicopter and landed it.</p><p>Private companies are also attempting to develop space planes of their own. The most prominent examples include Sierra Space’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sierraspace.com/space-transportation/dream-chaser-spaceplane/">Dream Chaser</a>, which could include both crewed and uncrewed variants, as well as the Dawn Aerospace’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dawnaerospace.com/spacelaunch">Mk-II Aurora</a>. While these projects are still in their early stages, there could be strong commercial incentives for investing in them.</p><p><strong>What Are They Good For?</strong></p><p>The most obvious reason to invest in space planes is to reduce the cost of access to space: the dream of reusable craft being able to insert payloads into orbit quickly and cheaply is an old one. This is the stated reason for India’s own RLV and the driving force for space plane development by private companies. </p><p>The direct military utility of space planes is unclear at this stage. The US X-37B is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37361/space-force-has-a-unit-dedicated-to-orbital-warfare-that-now-operates-the-x-37b-spaceplane">operated</a> by the Space Delta 9 unit of the Space Force, which is, among other things, responsible for ‘orbital warfare’. It is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33531/x-37bs-power-beaming-payload-a-reminder-of-potential-orbital-microwave-anti-satellite-weapons">possible</a> that future space planes could deploy a range of small payloads that can conduct space situational awareness (SSA) missions, carry out rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), or possibly use directed energy to dazzle or blind other orbital craft. However, the most likely military utility for space planes today is their ability to act as test beds to other technologies, such as autonomous manoeuvring in space and hypersonic capabilities. For now, at least, space planes are not harbingers of a new era of space warfare.</p><p>Our Reading Menu</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3373101/china-russia-space-cooperation-the-strategic-military-diplomatic-and-economic-i/">Report</a>] China-Russia Space Cooperation: The Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, and Economic Implications of a Growing Relationship.</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://www.news18.com/opinion/opinion-globalising-indias-dpi-for-a-common-digital-future-7780897.html">Op-ed</a>] Globalising India's DPI for a Common Digital Future by Bharath Reddy and Saurabh Todi.</p><p>[<a target="_blank" href="https://nadh.in/blog/this-time-it-feels-different/">Blog</a>] This time, it feels different by Kailash Nadh.</p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://hightechir.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1">hightechir.substack.com</a>
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